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Abstract
This paper describes a new analytical framework for the quantitative assessment of international
external positions. The framework links each country’s current net foreign asset position to its
current trade flows, forecasts of future trade flows, and expectations concerning future returns on
foreign assets and liabilities in an environment where countries cannot run Ponzi schemes or exploit
arbitrage opportunities in world financial markets. It provides guidance on how external positions
should be measured in the data, and on how the sustainability of a country’s current position can
be assessed. To illustrate its usefulness, I study the external positions of 12 countries (Australia,
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The United States
and The United Kingdom) between 1970 and 2011. In particular, I examine how changes in the
perceived risk associated with future returns across world financial markets contributed to evolution
of external positions before the 2008 financial crisis, and during the ensuing Great Recession.
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“Global imbalances are probably the most complex macroeconomic issue facing economists
and policy makers. They reflect many factors, from saving to investment to portfolio de-
cisions, in many countries. These cross-country diﬀerences in saving patterns, investment
patterns, and portfolio choices are in part “good” - a natural reflection of diﬀerences in
levels of development, demographic patterns, and other underlying economic fundamen-
tals. But they are also in part “bad,” reflecting distortions, externalities, and risks, at
the national and international level. So it is not a surprise that the topic is highly con-
troversial, and that observers disagree on the diagnosis and thus on the policies to be
adopted.” Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009)
Introduction
This paper proposes an analytical framework for the quantitative assessment of international external
positions. The framework links each country’s current net foreign asset position to its current trade
flows, forecasts of future trade flows, and expectations concerning future returns on foreign assets
and liabilities in an environment where countries cannot run Ponzi schemes or exploit arbitrage
opportunities in world financial markets. As such, it allows researchers and policy makers to quantify
the contribution of the many potential factors (both the “good” and “bad”, as Blanchard and Milesi-
Ferretti (2009) note) determining imbalances in net foreign asset positions and trade flows across
countries and through time. The framework also provides guidance on how external positions should
be measured in the data, and on how the sustainability of a country’s current position can be assessed.
In short, it is a diagnostic tool that can help researchers and policy makers work through the complex
issues associated with global imbalances. To illustrative its usefulness, I use the framework to study
the external positions of 12 countries (Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The United States and The United Kingdom) between 1970 and
2011. In particular, I examine how changes in the perceived risk associated with future returns
across world financial markets contributed to evolution of external positions before the 2008 financial
crisis, and during the ensuing Great Recession.
The framework I present incorporates several key features. First it accommodates the secular
increase in international trade flows and gross asset/liability positions that have taken place over
the past 40 years. The secular growth in both trade flows and positions greatly exceeds the growth
in GDP on a global and country-by-country basis. Over the past 40 years, the annual growth in
trade and positions exceeds the growth in GDP by an average of 2.6 and 4.8 percent, respectively,
across the countries I study. This feature of the data has proved to be a challenge for researchers
studying the determinants of global imbalances. For example, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) derive an
expression for a country’s net foreign asset position from a “de-trended” version of the consolidated
budget constraint (that governs the evolution of a country’s net foreign asset position from trade
flows and returns), that filters out the secular growth in trade flows and positions. Thus their
analysis focuses on the “cyclical” variations in net foreign asset positions, rather than the “total”
variations. Similarly, Corsetti and Konstantinou (2012) use the consolidated budget constraint to
derive an approximation to the current account that includes deterministic trends in the log ratios
of consumption, gross assets and gross liabilities to output to accommodate the long-term growth in
trade flows and positions (relative to GDP). In contrast, I develop an expression for a country’s total
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net foreign asset position from the consolidated budget constraint and show how it can be evaluated
empirically without counterfactual assumptions concerning the growth in trade and positions. This
approach has an important empirical advantage relative to the alternatives cited above. It allows us
to study the source of the persistent changes in many country’s external positions rather than just
their short-term variations around a secular trend.
The second key feature of my framework concerns the identification of expected future returns.
As a matter of logic (based on the consolidated budget constraint), expected future returns on a
country’s asset and liability portfolios must aﬀect the value its current net foreign asset position, so
pinning down these expectations is unavoidable in analyzing external positions. This is easily done
in textbook models where the only internationally traded asset is a risk free bond with a constant
interest rate (see, e.g., the intertemporal approach to the current account), but in the real world
countries’ asset and liability portfolios comprise equity, FDI, bonds and other securities, with risky
and volatile returns. Pinning down the expected future returns on these portfolios requires forecasts
for the future returns on diﬀerent securities and the composition of the portfolios. The need for
multilateral consistency further complicates this task: Expected returns in one country’s foreign
asset portfolio must be matched by the expected return in others’ liability portfolios. To avoid these
complications, I use no-arbitrage conditions to identify the impact of expected future returns on
net foreign asset positions via forecasts of a single variable, the world Stochastic Discount Factor
(SDF). SDFs play a central role in modern finance theory (linking security prices and cash flows)
and appear in theoretical examinations of the determinants of net foreign asset positions (see, e.g.,
Obstfeld, 2012). A key step in my analysis is to show how the world SDF can be constructed from
data on returns and then used to pin down expectations of future returns that aﬀect net foreign
asset positions.
Since SDF’s are much less commonly used in macroeconomics than in finance, it is worth high-
lighting the benefits of incorporating the world SDF into my analytical framework. First, its use
imposes multilateral consistency. No country’s can unilaterally benefit from expected future return
diﬀerentials between its foreign asset and liability holdings. Second, the use of the SDF does not
require any assumption about how the composition of a particular country’s asset or liability port-
folio are determined. They may represent, in aggregate, the optimal portfolio decisions of private
sector agents, or they may not. So, to the extent that capital controls aﬀect the composition of
portfolios, the presence, absence or change in controls doesn’t invalidate the use of the world SDF
in the determination of a particular country’s net foreign asset position. Third, although expected
future returns on foreign assets and liabilities may diﬀer from the forecasts of the world SDF under
special circumstances, it is easy to test empirically whether these circumstance apply to a particular
country. Fourth, the use of the SDF allows us to distinguish between the eﬀects of changing expecta-
tions concerning the future path of the risk free rate on global imbalances, and the eﬀects of changes
in perceived (systematic) risk that is reflected in the expected returns on risky assets and liabilities.
Finally, I use the SDF to focus on external positions that are not supported by Ponzi-schemes. This
analytical focus is important. Any external position must be supported by agents willing to hold the
country’s asset/liability positions, but no rational agent would willingly participate (i.e. hold the
country’s liabilities) in a Ponzi-scheme. Consequently, any analysis of external positions that allows
for the presence of Ponzi-schemes implicitly relies on the fragile assumption that (some) agents are
acting against their own best interests. It is straightforward to exclude external positions supported
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by Ponzi-schemes with a condition that involves the world SDF.
Traditionally, researchers and policy makers concerned with global imbalances have focused their
attention on current account balances. For example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) examine how
changes in current account balances between 2008 and 20010 relate to pre-crisis current account
gaps estimated from a panel regression model. Similar empirical models of current account deter-
mination can be found in Chinn and Prasad (2003), Gruber and Kamin (2007), Lee et al. (2008),
Gagnon (2011) and others. Current accounts also remain a focus in current multilateral surveil-
lance frameworks used by the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission (see,
e.g., IMF, 2012 and EU, 2010). Nevertheless, there are reasons to question whether this attention
is warranted. First, current account imbalances are simply not that informative about the changes
in net foreign asset positions, or equivalently, cumulated past current account imbalances produce
only an approximation to the current net foreign asset position valued at market prices. These dis-
crepancies arise because the Balance of Payments methodology ignores the capital gains and losses
on existing foreign asset and liability positions that arise from exchange rate variations and changes
in security prices, but the gains and losses are reflected in the net foreign asset positions. Second,
as Obstfeld (2012) notes, by focusing on the current account we run the risk of neglecting potential
balance sheet vulnerabilities to unexpected changes in exchange rates and security prices that could
significantly alter the market values of foreign assets and liabilities. Researchers and policy makers
are, of course, well aware of these issues. The problem is the lack of an analytic framework that
allows for a more comprehensive quantitative assessment of global imbalances.
The current account is not the focus of the framework I present. When one starts from a min-
imal set of assumptions concerning international transactions (budget constraints and no-arbitrage
conditions), the current account does not appear as an important economic measure of a country’s
external position. What emerges, instead, is a measure that combines the country’s current net
foreign asset position and trade flows. Specifically, I measure each country’s external position as the
gap between its current net foreign asset position and the steady state present value of the current
trade deficit, where the latter is computed at the point where expected future growth in imports and
exports are equal and the expected future returns on all securities are constant (but not necessarily
equal). The framework also shows us how to normalize this measure across countries. We simply
divide by the current trade flow (i.e., the sum of exports and imports). This is a departure from
the standard practice of normalizing current account imbalances and net foreign asset positions by
GDP. Normalizing by trade rather than GDP avoids problems associated with the secular growth
in trade relative to GDP discussed above. Moreover, the measure provides a natural way to identify
external imbalances. Market clearing insures that the measure aggregates across countries to give a
world external position of zero. The measure also diﬀers from zero for an individual country when
expectations for future trade flows and returns diﬀer from their unconditional (steady state) values.
So the analysis of how diﬀerent factors (both the “good” and “bad”) aﬀect these expectations is the
key to understanding the source of global imbalances across countries and through time.
In the second half of the paper I study the external positions of 12 countries (Australia, Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The United States and The
United Kingdom). I first show how the world SDF can be estimated from data on returns and
discuss how the estimates can be tested for specification errors. Next I turn to the identification
of expectations. In theory, each country’s external position is determined by agents’ expectations
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concerning future growth in exports, imports and the world SDF. For the purpose of this paper I
identify these expectations from VAR forecasts. Following Campbell and Shiller (1987), this is a
very common approach in academic research, but it is not without its limitations. I discuss how
alternative identification methods could (and should) be used by policy makers when the framework
is used for multilateral surveillance.
My empirical analysis takes three perspectives. First I examine the implications of my framework
for the cross-country distribution of external positions each year between 1970 and 2011. In this
analysis, each country faces the same set of world financial conditions as summarized by the expected
path for the future world SDF. Cross-country diﬀerences in the positions are thus attributable to
diﬀerences in expectations concerning future trade flows and diﬀerences in each country’s exposure to
expected changes in future financial conditions. Second, I consider the dynamics of external positions
on a country-by-country basis. This analysis provides evidence on the diﬀerent channels through
which adjustment in net foreign asset positions and trade flows takes place. As in Gourinchas and
Rey (2007), my framework identifies two adjustment channels: the trade and valuation channels.
Over the entire sample period (1970-2011), the trade channel appears to be the most important
adjustment channel for the majority of countries I study. The one notable exception is The United
States, where adjustment via the valuation channel dominates. My third perspective focuses on
global imbalances in the past decade. Here I examine how changes in financial conditions aﬀected
imbalances before the 2008 financial crises and during the following Great Recession. I find evidence
of large swings in systemic risk (measured by the diﬀerence between the expected future path for the
world SDF and the risk free rate), with a large rise occurring between 2006 and 2009. This change
in risk produced significant adjustments in the external positions of countries running large trade
imbalances (e.g. Australia, China and the United States). However, overall, most of the adjustment
in external positions between 2006 and 2009 appears to have taken place through the trade channel
via revisions in expected future trade flows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 describes the data and documents
the secular variations in international trade flows and positions. Sections 2 and 3 develop the
analytical framework. I first discuss the problem of determining the value a country’s net foreign
asset position without the use of an SDF. I then show how the world SDF is used to determine
net foreign asset positions that are not supported by Ponzi schemes. Section 4 discusses empirical
implementation. The results of my empirical analysis are reported in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7
concludes.
1 Data
I study the external positions of twelve countries: the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United States and the United Kingdom) together with Australia, China, India, South Korea
and Thailand. Data on each country’s foreign asset and liability portfolios and the returns on the
portfolios come from the databased constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and updated in
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) available via the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
These data provide information on the market value of the foreign asset and liability portfolios at the
end of each year together with the returns on the portfolios from the end of one year to the next. A
detailed discussion of how these data series are constructed can be found in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
-4-
Figure 1: Net Foreign Assets and Net Exports
A: Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) B: Net Exports (% of GDP )
C: Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) B: Net Exports (% of GDP )
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(2009). I also use data on exports, imports and GDP for each country and data on the one year U.S.
T-bill rate, 10 year U.S. T-bond rate and U.S. inflation. All asset and liability positions, trade flows
and GDP levels are transformed into constant 2005 U.S. dollars using the prevailing exchange rates
and U.S. price deflators. All portfolio returns are similarly transformed into real U.S. returns. The
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti position data is constructed on an annual basis, so my analysis below is
conducted at an annual frequency.1Although the span of individual data series diﬀers from country
to country, most of my analysis uses data spanning 1970-2011.
Figure 1 provides a visual perspective on the task of understanding the behavior of external
positions and trade flows across the world’s major economies. Panels A and C plot the ratio of
each country’s net foreign asset (NFA) position (i.e., the diﬀerence between the value of its foreign
asset and liability portfolios) to GDP between 1980 and 2011. These plots display two noteworthy
features. First, they clearly show that variations in the NFA/GDP ratios of many countries are
highly persistent, with significant movements often lasting decades. This means that any analysis
of the drivers of the NFA/GDP ratios must focus on the source of movements below business-cycle
frequencies. The second feature concerns the dispersion of the ratios across countries. Panel A shows
that the dispersion has increased markedly across the G7 in the last decade, with ratios ranging from
-20 to 80 percent of GDP in 2011. With the notable exception of Canada, imbalances between the
value of foreign assets and liabilities have been steadily growing across the G7 for the past 30 years.
Panel C shows that the dispersion in NFA/GDP ratios also increased across the non-G7 countries in
the last decade. Panels B and D plot the ratios of net exports (exports minus imports) to GDP for
the comparable countries over the same sample period. Again, we can see that these ratios display
a good deal of time series persistences. Among the G7, the ratios have become most dispersed
since the early 1990s, while there is no clear change in the dispersion of the ratios among the other
countries.
The plots in Figure 1 follow the standard practice of measuring NFA positions and net exports
relative to GDP. This normalization facilitates comparisons of external positions and trade flows
across countries with economies of diﬀerent sizes at a point in time, but is less useful for intertemporal
comparisons. To understand why, Figure 2 plots the sum of foreign asset and liability positions as a
fraction of GDP and the sum of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP for each of the countries
on the dataset between 1980 and 2011. Clearly, both trade and gross foreign positions have been
growing persistently relative to GDP in every country. Moreover, it is clear that gross positions rose
particularly rapidly in the last decade. The plots in Figure 2 also illustrate how the cross-country
diﬀerences in the degree of openness (both in terms of trade flows and gross positions) have increased
over time. These trends complicate intertemporal comparisons of NFA and net export positions.
For example, should a fall in a country’s NFA position from -20 to -30 percent of GDP be viewed as
a significant deterioration in its external position when the gross asset position has risen from 100
to 200 percent of GDP? Similarly, does a constant net export-to-GDP ratio really indicate stability
in a country’s trade position when total trade is steadily rising relative to GDP?
1Ideally, we would like to track international positions and returns at a higher (e.g. quarterly) frequency, but
constructing the market value of foreign assets and liabilities for a large set of countries is a herculean task. For
the United States, Gourinchas and Rey (2005) compute quarterly market values for four categories of foreign asset
and liabilities: equity, foreign direct investment, debt and other, by combining data on international positions with
information on the capital gains and losses. In Evans (2012b) I revise and update their data to 2012:IV. Corsetti
and Konstantinou (2012) also work with quarterly U.S. position data which they impute from the annual Milesi-
Ferretti data using quarterly capital flows. For a discussion of the diﬀerent methods used to construct return data,
see Gourinchas and Rey (2013).
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Figure 2: Total Assets and Trade
A: Foreign Assets and Liabilities (% of GDP) B: Exports and Imports (% of GDP )
C: Foreign Assets and Liabilities (% of GDP) D: Exports and Imports (% of GDP )
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Table 1: Growth in Trade and Foreign Positions
Trade Growth Position Growth Export-Import Diﬀerential
Mean Std. AR(1) Mean Std. AR(1) Mean Std. AR(1)
A:
Canada 4.660 5.557 0.138 6.083 10.153 -0.289 -0.836 4.764 0.208
France 4.790 4.238 0.083 8.343 9.318 0.148 0.276 3.641 -0.039
Germany 5.057 4.573 0.031 9.099 11.186 0.226 0.560 3.827 0.053
Italy 4.190 5.290 -0.107 6.920 11.988 0.307 0.657 5.552 0.063
Japan 5.081 6.986 -0.132 9.711 12.926 0.472 1.047 9.263 0.129
United Kingdom 4.200 4.142 0.148 9.348 8.775 0.282 -0.116 3.770 0.204
United States 5.652 5.356 0.047 8.446 5.430 0.368 0.379 7.368 0.538
Australia 5.481 4.837 -0.310 9.016 13.770 0.069 -1.253 10.461 -0.017
China 12.090 10.131 0.140 16.850 7.890 -0.043 0.157 13.208 -0.017
India 7.771 6.718 0.249 8.924 12.694 0.199 1.274 7.035 0.071
South Korea 11.529 8.635 0.058 11.661 12.475 -0.018 2.842 11.106 0.068
Thailand 8.172 9.239 0.022 9.778 10.858 0.259 1.736 12.911 -0.292
Average 6.552 4.456 -0.117 8.751 7.175 0.144 0.453 2.799 0.140
B: Relative to GDP Growth
Canada 1.787 4.075 0.162 3.210 10.447 -0.294
France 2.579 3.086 -0.023 6.131 9.157 0.080
Germany 2.759 3.807 0.144 6.800 11.015 0.173
Italy 2.177 3.834 -0.177 4.907 12.135 0.222
Japan 2.477 5.854 -0.236 7.107 12.032 0.402
United Kingdom 2.042 2.987 -0.114 7.191 7.961 0.243
United States 2.877 3.758 -0.071 5.671 4.971 0.312
Australia 2.271 8.438 -0.327 5.806 11.887 -0.017
China 1.900 17.822 0.049 6.660 14.096 -0.042
India 2.554 6.759 0.067 3.708 15.679 -0.042
South Korea 5.316 6.549 0.103 5.448 12.693 -0.064
Thailand 2.503 7.398 -0.189 4.109 10.152 0.048
Average 2.624 3.827 -0.189 4.822 6.863 0.064
Notes: Panel A reports the sample mean and standard deviation (in annual percent) and first order autocorrelation coeﬃcient for: (i) trade growth
1
2 ( xt + mt), (ii) the position growth
1
2 ( fat + mflt), and (iii) the export-import growth diﬀerential  xt   mt; where xt, mt fat and flt denote
the logs of exports, imports, the value of foreign assets and foreign liabilities, respectively (in constant U.S. dollars). Panel B reports statistics for (i)
the relative growth in trade 12 ( xt + mt)  yt and (ii) the relative growth in positions liabilities 12 ( fat + mflt)  yt; where yt denotes the log
of real GDP. All statistics are computed in annual data over the sample period of 1971-2011.
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Table 1 provides statistical evidence complimenting the plots in Figure 2. Panel A reports sample
statistics for the annual growth in trade, gross positions, and the export-import growth diﬀerential.
Trade growth is computed as the average growth rate for real exports and imports 12 ( xt + mt),
position growth by the average growth in foreign assets and liabilities 12 ( fat +  flt), and the
export-import diﬀerential as the diﬀerence between the growth in exports and imports,  xt  mt;
where xt, mt, fat and flt denote the logs of exports, imports, the value of foreign assets and foreign
liabilities, respectively; and   is the first-diﬀerence operator. (Throughout I use lowercase letters to
denote the natural log of a variable.) As the table shows, the mean trade growth and mean position
growth are similar across the G7 countries, with mean position growth roughly two to four precent
higher. Cross-country diﬀerence in mean trade growth and position are more pronounced across the
other countries. The mean export-import growth diﬀerentials shown in the right-hand columns are
small by comparison. Some of the cross-country diﬀerences in the mean trade and position growth
rates reflect diﬀerences in the degree of economic development that in turn are reflected in GDP
growth. This can be seen in Panel B where I report statistics for trade growth and position growth
relative to GDP growth, measured as 12 ( xt+ mt)  yt and 12 ( fat+ flt)  yt, respectively;
where yt is the log of real GDP. Here the cross-country diﬀerences in mean growth rates are much
smaller. Notice, however, that mean rates are all positive. Averaging across all the countries, trade
grew approximately 2.6 percent faster than GDP, while foreign asset and liability positions grew 4.8
percent faster.
Figure 3: Global Growth Rates
Notes: The figure plots the five-year moving average of the cross-country aver-
ages for: (i) GDP growth 1N
P
n yn,t, (ii) trade growth
1
2N
P
n( xn,t +
 mn,t) and (iii) position growth
1
2N
P
n fan,t +  fln,t) all in annual
percent.
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Figure 2 and Table 1 show that, on average, the growth in global trade and financial positions
have greatly exceeded global output growth in the last three decades. Year-by-year, the picture
is more complicated. Figure 3 plots the five-year moving average of the cross-country average for
GDP growth, trade growth and position growth between 1980 and 2011. These growth rates are
computed as 1N
P
n yn,t,
1
2N
P
n( xn,t + mn,t) and
1
2N
P
n fan,t + fln,t), respectively; from
the trade and position data of each country n = {1, 2, ...N} in the dataset. The plots reveal that
swings in global trade growth and position growth have been much larger than global business cycles
represented by the growth in GDP. The size and timing of the swings in position growth are even
more striking. The last three decades witnessed two episodes of increasingly rapid growth in foreign
asset and liability positions; the first in the mid-1980’s and the second between 2000 and 2006.
Conversely, growth declined markedly in three episodes; the first in the early 1980’s, the second
following the 1997 Asian crises, and the third starting in 2007. The first and third episodes also
witnessed a significant fall in trade growth.
The growth in both trade and positions relative to GDP present a challenge in studying coun-
tries’ NFA positions because standard models describe a world where these features are absent. For
example, in standard open-economy models consumer’s preferences tie exports and imports to rel-
ative prices and domestic consumption (see, e.g. Evans, 2011). In these models relative prices are
constant in the steady state so exports and imports share the same trend as output. This means that
trade growth cannot exceed output growth in the long run. Similarly, open economy models with
many financial assets predict that position growth equals output growth in the long run. Here the
growth in the value of a country’s foreign asset and liability positions are determined by aggregating
individuals’ steady state portfolio choices. In standard models these choices imply that individual’s
foreign asset and liability holdings are constant fraction of wealth, so a country’s position shares the
same long run trend as GDP.2 Clearly, these models could not generate the global growth plots in
Figure 3.
2 Net Foreign Assets, Trade and Returns
The framework I develop contains three elements: (i) the consolidated budget constraint that links
a country’s foreign asset and liability positions to exports, imports and returns; (ii) a condition that
rules out international Ponzi schemes; and (iii) a no-arbitrage condition that restricts the behavior
of returns. In this section I introduce the first two elements and explain why they are not suﬃcient
for constructing the framework we need. Section 3 combines all three elements into the framework
I will use.
I begin with country’s n0s consolidated budget constraint:
FAn,t   FLn,t = Xn,t  Mn,t +Rfan,tFAn,t 1  Rfln,tFLn,t 1. (1)
Here FAn,t and FLn,t denote the value of foreign assets and liabilities of country n at the end of
year t, while Xn,t and Mn,t represent the flow of exports and imports during year t, all measured in
real terms (constant U.S. dollars). The gross real return on the foreign asset and liability portfolios
of country n between the end of years t   1 and t are denoted by Rfan,t and Rfln,t, respectively.
2See, e.g., Evans (2012a), or the models surveyed in Coeurdacier and Rey (2012).
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Equation (1) is no more than an accounting identity. It should hold true for any country provided
the underlying data on positions, trade flows and returns are accurate. Notice, also, that FAn,t and
FLn,t represent the values of portfolios of assets and liabilities comprising equity, bond and FDI
holdings, and thatRfan,t andRfln,t, are the corresponding portfolio returns. These returns will generally
diﬀer across countries in the same year because of cross-country diﬀerences in the composition of
asset and liability portfolios.
It proves useful to rewrite (1) in terms of a reference (gross) real return, Rt, and excess portfolio
returns returns, ERfan,t = Rfan,t  Rt and ERfln,t = Rfat  Rt:
NFAn,t = Xn,t  Mn,t +RtNFAn,t 1 + ERfan,tFAn,t 1   ERfln,tFLn,t 1, (2)
where NFAn,t = FAn,t   FLn,t is the net foreign asset position at the end of year t. Re-arranging
this expression as
NFAn,t =
1
Rt+1
(Mn,t+1  Xn,t+1) + 1
Rt+1
 
ERfln,t+1FLn,t   ERfan,t+1FAn,t
 
+
1
Rt+1
NFAn,t+1,
dividing by the country’s GDP, Yn,t, and iterating forward produces
NFAn,t
Yn,t
=
1X
i=1
Dn,t+i
⇢
Mn,t+i  Xn,t+i
Yn,t+i
 
+
1X
i=1
Dn,t+i
⇢
ERfln,t+iFLn,t+i 1
Yn,t+i
  ER
fa
n,t+iFAn,t+i 1
Yn,t+i
 
+ lim
i!1
Dn,t+i
⇢
NFAn,t+i
Yn,t+i
 
, (3)
where
Dn,t+i =
iY
j=1
⇢
Yn,t+j
Rt+jYn,t+j 1
 
is the year t discount factor for year t+ i. The final step is to take expectations on both sides of (3)
conditioned on year t information (that includes the value of NFAn,t/Ynt):
NFAn,t
Yn,t
= Et
1X
i=1
Dn,t+i
⇢
Mn,t+i  Xn,t+i
Yn,t+i
 
+ Et
1X
i=1
Dn,t+i
⇢
ERfln,t+iFLn,t+i 1
Yn,t+i
  ER
fa
n,t+iFAn,t+i 1
Yn,t+i
 
+ Et lim
i!1
Dn,t+i
⇢
NFAn,t+i
Yn,t+i
 
. (4)
Equation (4) is little more that an accounting identity that follows from the budget constraint in
(1) and the consistent application of the conditional expectations operator, Et. It implies that
any NFA/GDP ratio we observe reflects a set of expectations concerning future trade flows, excess
returns, discount factors and the long-horizon NFA/GDP ratio. In the absence of any restrictions on
these expectations it is impossible to conduct meaningful cross-country comparisons of NFA/GDP
ratios at a point in time, or make sense of their dynamics through time.
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The restrictions implied by simple textbook models are a natural place to start. Consider the
third term on the right-hand-side of (4). This term is equal to expected present value of the country’s
net asset position as the horizon rises without limit relative to current GDP.3 In a perfect foresight
model the term could only be negative if foreign agents were willing to foregone some of their lifetime
resources by lending indefinitely to agents in country n, something they would never find optimal to
do. Conversely, country-n agents would have to be willing to foregone some of their lifetime resources
if the term were positive. In sum, therefore, optimal behavior in a perfect foresight model ensures
that the third term disappears. In models with uncertainty things are more complicated because
lifetime resources are unknown ex ante. Under these circumstances the third term disappears if
agents are unwilling to lend to entities that intend running a Ponzi scheme of rolling over their debt
indefinitely into the future (see, e.g. Bohn, 1995). I return to the implications of Ponzi-schemes in
Section 3 below.
Textbook models also place restrictions on the remaining terms on the right-hand-side of (4). In a
model where all international borrowing and lending takes place via a single risk free bond, countries
either have positive foreign asset or liability positions depending on whether they are international
lenders with positive bond holdings or borrowers with negative holdings. Under theses circumstances
the returns on assets and liabilities are both equal to the risk free rate, which identifies the reference
rate, Rt. This means that ERfan,t = ERfln,t = 0 for all t so, imposing the no-Ponzi restriction, we are
left with
NFAn,t
Yn,t
= Et
1X
i=1
Dn,t+i
⇢
Mn,t+i  Xn,t+i
Yn,t+i
 
. (5)
In contrast to (4), this expression provides a well-defined framework for considering both cross-
country NFA/GDP ratios at a point in time, and their dynamics through time. The equation states
the ratio for country n equals the expected present discounted value of future trade deficits measured
relative to future GDP, discounted at the cumulated risk free rate minus the GDP growth rate. So
cross-country diﬀerences in the NFA/GDP ratios at a point in time must either reflect diﬀerences
in prospective future trade deficits, and/or diﬀerences in prospective future GDP growth,  yn,t+i,
that aﬀect the discount factor Dn,t+i = exp(
Pi
j=1 yn,t+j   rt+j). Through time, changes in the
NFA/GDP ratio must reflect news about future trade deficits and/or news concerning future GDP
growth and risk free rate. Moreover, in a world where all international borrowing and lending
occurs via a risk free bond, these changes in the NFA/GDP ratio are accomplished via changes in
domestic consumption relative to GDP (because there are not capital gains or losses on existing
NFA positions).
Equation (5) is unsuitable for studying actual NFA/GDP ratios for a couple of reasons. First, the
average rate of GDP growth exceeds reasonable estimates of the risk free rate for all the countries
under study. Thus, the discount factor Dn,t+i would often be increasing in the horizon i making
the present value term sensitive to long-horizon forecasts of trade deficits, which are inherently
imprecise. Of course one way to alleviate this problem is to choose a reference rate Rt such that
Dn,t+i is always declining in the horizon i given any prospect for future GDP growth, but it unclear
how this choice should actually be made. Alternatively we could rewrite (5) without reference to
3Formally, we can rewrite the term as Y  1n,t Et limi!1{
Qi
j=1R
 1
t+j}NFAn,t+i.
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GDP as
NFAn,t
Yn,t
= Et
1X
i=1
⇣Qi
j=1R
 1
t+j
⌘⇢Mn,t+i  Xn,t+i
Yn,t
 
.
This formulation avoids the discount factor problem, but it now requires forecasts for future trade
deficits normalized by current rather than future GDP. In view of the secular increase in trade
relative to GDP shown in Figure 2, such forecasts are again likely to be imprecise.
The second reason concerns the composition of foreign asset and liability portfolios. In reality,
most countries’ portfolios include equities, FDI holdings, long and short-term bonds and other
securities (in time-varying proportions). Consequently, there are cross-country diﬀerences in the
returns on foreign asset portfolios and foreign liability portfolios and diﬀerences between the returns
on assets and liabilities for individual countries. It is thus impossible to choose a reference return
such that the excess portfolio returns, ERfan,t and ERfln,t, are zero across countries in every year.
To illustrate the empirical relevance of this issue, I consider how excess returns contribute to the
dynamics of the NFA positions when the real return on U.S. T-bills is used as the reference rate.
From (2) we can write the change in the NFA position as
 NFAn,t = Xn,t  Mn,t + (Rt   1)NFAn,t 1 +
 
ERfan,tFAn,t 1   ERfln,tFLn,t 1
 
. (6)
If the country only uses the U.S. T-bill market for international borrowing and lending ERfan,t =
ERfln,t = 0 so changes in its NFA position arise from the current account balance identified by the
first three terms on the right-hand-side ((Rt   1)NFAn,t 1 identifies the net investment income
balance).4 We can therefore gauge the importance of the excess portfolio returns as a driver of NFA
dynamics by computing the contribution of Xn,t   Mn,t + (Rt   1)NFAn,t 1 to the variance of
 NFAn,t in the data.5
Panel I of Table 2 reports estimates of these variance contributions together with the upper and
lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval. Panel II reports estimates using the average real
return on U.S. T-bills as the reference rate for comparison. As the table shows, excess returns on
existing asset and liability positions are the dominant driver of NFA changes across all but one of the
the countries in the dataset. The exception is China, where the current account balances account
for close to 100 percent of the variance in NFA changes (indeed 100 lies within the confidence
interval).6 In all the other countries, current account imbalances account for less than 30 percent
of the variance in the NFA changes, in some cases very much less. These results are robust to the
time-series variation in the reference rate. The estimated variance contributions in Panel II using a
constant rate are very similar to the estimates in Panel I.
The results in Table 2 show that excess returns on existing asset liability positions played a
4For the sake of clarity, this discussion abstracts from the eﬀects of the capital account balance, unilateral transfers
and the statistical discrepancy on NFA dynamics.
5Equation (6) implies that
V[ NFAn,t] = CV [Xn,t  Mn,t + (Rt   1)NFAn,t 1, NFAn,t]
+ CV
⇥ 
ERfan,tFAn,t 1   ERfln,tFLn,t 1
 
, NFAn,t
⇤
,
so by least squares the variance contribution can be estimated as the slope coeﬃcient from the regression of Xn,t  
Mn,t + (Rt   1)NFAn,t 1 on  NFAn,t; i.e. cCV [Xn,t  Mn,t + (Rt   1)NFAn,t 1, NFAn,t] /bV[ NFAn,t].
6This finding arises from the fact that U.S. Treasury securities comprised a large fraction of China’s foreign asset
portfolio and that the variations in excess returns on long-term U.S. bonds have been small relative to the current
account balances over the sample period.
-13-
T
able
2:
 
N
F
A
V
ariance
C
ontributions
I
II
Low
er
E
stim
ate
U
pper
Low
er
E
stim
ate
U
pper
C
anada
-8.59%
15.59%
39.77%
-7.71%
17.11%
41.92%
France
-1.10%
7.59%
16.29%
-0.41%
8.41%
17.24%
G
erm
any
4.47%
24.45%
44.44%
4.18%
25.79%
47.39%
Italy
-0.34%
8.14%
16.61%
-3.50%
6.52%
16.54%
Japan
3.46%
18.87%
34.27%
2.87%
21.27%
39.67%
U
nited
K
ingdom
-8.99%
-0.87%
7.24%
-8.28%
-0.30%
7.67%
U
nited
States
-10.53%
1.75%
14.04%
-10.58%
1.81%
14.20%
A
ustralia
-20.75%
7.19%
35.13%
-16.17%
11.77%
39.71%
C
hina
71.46%
94.57%
117.67%
69.51%
94.01%
118.51%
India
-6.12%
2.87%
11.86%
-7.19%
2.47%
12.13%
South
K
orea
-21.16%
5.69%
32.54%
-19.80%
6.45%
32.70%
T
hailand
-3.86%
26.87%
57.61%
-2.38%
28.17%
58.73%
N
otes:
T
he
table
reports
the
contribution
of
X
n
,t  
M
n
,t
+
(R
t  
1)
N
F
A
n
,t 
1
to
the
variance
of
 
N
F
A
n
,t com
puted
asthe
slope
coeﬃ
cientfrom
the
regression
of
X
n
,t  
M
n
,t +
(R
t  
1)
N
F
A
n
,t 
1
on
 
N
F
A
n
,t .
T
he
colum
ns
headed
Low
er
and
U
pper
report
the
low
er
and
upper
bounds
of
the
95%
confidence
intervalaround
the
slope
estim
ate
com
puted
from
the
O
LS
standard
error
for
the
estim
ate.
T
he
results
in
panelI
use
the
realreturn
on
U
.S.T
-bills
as
the
reference
rate,those
in
panelII
use
the
average
realreturn
on
U
.S.T
-bills.
significantex
postrole
in
driving
N
FA
dynam
icsform
ostcountriesoverthe
pastforty
years.
T
he
key
question
isthis:
Isitreasonable
to
assum
e
thatthese
excessreturnsw
ere
allcom
pletely
unanticipated
at
the
tim
e?
If
they
w
ere,the
second
term
in
(4)
can
be
safely
ignored,so
the
N
FA
ratio
rem
ains
pinned
dow
n
by
the
present
discounted
value
of
future
trade
surpluses
(in
the
absence
of
Ponzi
schem
es).
O
n
the
other
hand,ifthe
realized
excess
returns
in
part
represent
com
pensation
for
risk
that
w
as
anticipated
ex
ante,then
(absent
Ponzi-schem
es)
the
N
FA
ratio
is
pinned
dow
n
by
N
F
A
n
,t
Y
n
,t
=
E
t
1Xi=
1
D
n
,t+
i ⇢
M
n
,t+
i  
X
n
,t+
i
Y
n
,t+
i
 
+
E
t
1Xi=
1
D
n
,t+
i ⇢
E
R
fln,t+
i F
L
n
,t+
i 
1
Y
n
,t+
i
 
E
R
fan,t+
i F
A
n
,t+
i 
1
Y
n
,t+
i
 
.
H
ere
financialconsiderations
play
a
direct
role
in
the
determ
ination
ofthe
N
FA
ratio
via
the
second
expected
present
value
term
on
the
right-hand-side.
To
illustrate
the
econom
ic
intuition
behind
this
term
,
im
agine
that
som
e
new
s
leads
investors
across
the
w
orld
to
change
their
perception
ofthe
risk
associated
w
ith
holding
a
particular
class
of
country’s
n
liabilities,say
equity.
Ifthe
equilibrium
equity
risk
prem
ium
rises
in
response,and
there
are
no
oﬀsetting
changes
in
the
risk
prem
ia
on
the
country’s
other
assets
or
liabilities,the
expected
excess
return
on
the
liability
portfolio
increases
producing
a
rise
in
the
present
value
term
.
A
t
the
-14-
same time, the rise in the equity risk premium induces a drop in the current price the country’s
equity liabilities so that current value of the country’s liability position falls and its NFA position
rises. Thus, changes in the risk premia on the securities present in a country’s asset and liability
portfolio can alter NFA ratios by producing capital gains and losses on existing asset and liability
holdings. Quantifying these financial eﬀects is a complicated proposition. Even if historical data were
available, simple time series forecasts will not generally produce paths for ERfln,t+iFLn,t+i 1/Yn,t+i
and ERfan,t+iFAn,t+i 1/Yn,t+i that are consistent with the future values of the NFA ratio that satisfy
the present value expression.
In sum, while equation (4) appears a natural starting point, we quickly run into problems using
it as an analytic framework for studying NFA positions across countries and through time.
3 Analytic Framework
This section presents the analytic framework I use to the study the NFA positions of the countries
in the dataset. As above, the positions are pinned down by an expected present value expression
that is derived from the country’s consolidated budget constraint. I also make use of a no-arbitrage
condition that restricts the behavior of the returns on each country’s foreign asset and liability
portfolios. This additional condition is key to identifying the determinants of the NFA positions in
an analytic framework that is amenable to empirical analysis.
The World SDF
In a world where financial assets with the same payoﬀs have the same prices and there are no
restrictions on the construction of portfolios (such as short sales constraints), there exists a positive
random, Kt+1, such that
1 = Et[Kt+1Rit+1], (7)
where Rit+1 is the (gross real) return on any freely traded asset i. As above, Et[.] denotes expectations
conditioned on common period-t information. The variable Kt+1 is known as the pricing kernel or
Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF). This condition is very general. It does not rely on the preferences
of investors, the rationality of their expectations, or the completeness of financial markets.7
To illustrate the economic intuition behind (13), consider first a world where all investors have the
same time-separable utility defined over consumption, Et
P1
i=0  
iU(Ct+i). The first-order condition
governing the investors’ optimal holding of asset i is 1 = Et[ {U 0(Ct+1)/U 0(Ct)}Rit+1], so under these
circumstances the SDF equals the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) common to
all investors. Next, suppose that the world is populated by investors with diﬀerent preferences and
a complete set of financial markets. In this environment any asset can be represented as a portfolio
of contingent claims. In particular, the price of asset i is Pit =
P
z2Z Pt(z)X it+1(z), where X it+1(z)
is the payoﬀ on asset i when the period- t+1 state of the world is z, and Pt(z) is the period-t price
of contingent claim to state z. By definition the return on asset i in state z is given by Rit+1(z) =
X it+1(z)/Pit , so this condition can be rewritten as 1 =
P
z2Z ⇡t(z)Kt+1(z)Rit+1(z) = Et[Kt+1Rit+1],
where Kt+1(z) = Pt(z)/⇡t(z) and ⇡t(z) denotes the conditional probability of state z occurring in
period t+1. Thus, when markets are complete, the SDF is equal to the ratio of the contingent claims
7For a textbook discussion of SDFs, see Cochrane (2001).
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price of future state z to the probability of state z. Finally, in a world with incomplete markets and
heterogeneous investors (13) still holds but there may exist more than one SDF that satisfies the
no-arbitrage condition. In this case there is a first-order condition involving Rit+1 and the IMRS for
each investor, so each investor’s IMRS works as a SDF for pricing all the freely traded assets. Unlike
the complete markets world, there may be idiosyncratic diﬀerences between the IMRS of diﬀerent
investors because they cannot completely share the risks they face, but any one will work as an SDF
that satisfies the no-arbitrage relation in (13).
If condition in (13) applies to the returns on every security in a country’s asset and liability
portfolios, it also applies to the returns on the portfolios themselves; i.e.
1 = Et[Kt+1Rfan,t+1] and 1 = Et[Kt+1Rfln,t+1]. (8)
The present value expression for the NFA position I develop below assumes that these conditions
hold for the returns on the portfolios of assets and liabilities of all countries. This is not a particularly
strong assumption. For example, it does not require one to take a stand on how the composition
of asset and liability portfolios are determined. To see why, note that Rft+1 =
P
j ↵j,tR
fj
t+1 where
R
fj
t+1 denotes the return on f = {fa, fl} (asset or liability) security j and ↵j,t are the ex ante
portfolio shares (determined in period t) with
P
j ↵j,t = 1. As long as the no-arbitrage condition
applies to the returns on the individual securities, then Et[Kt+1Rfn,t+1] = Et[
P
j ↵j,tKt+1Rfjt+1] =P
j ↵j,tEt[Kt+1Rfjt+1] = 1 for f = {fa, fl} and any set of portfolio shares ↵j,t. Nor is it necessary
to assume that a particular security is freely traded throughout the world. While the presence of
restrictions such as capital controls and short sales constraints may inhibit trade in security j for
investors in some countries, Et[Kt+1Rfjt+1] will still equal unity if the security’s price is determined
by the actions of the investors who can trade freely (as seems likely for many widely-held securities;
e.g., U.S. Treasury securities).
The conditions in (13) have two important implications that I exploit below. First, notice that the
SDF is common to the condition involving the portfolio returns on assets and liabilities. As I noted
above, changes in expected future returns aﬀect a country’s NFA position via capital gains and losses
on existing asset and liability positions. Condition (13) links changes in expected future asset returns
and liability returns, which tie down the possible capital gains and losses. The second implication
concerns the cross country behavior of expected future returns. Although the composition of asset
and liability portfolios diﬀers across countries, condition (13) applies simultaneously to the returns
for all countries n. Put diﬀerently, expected variations in the SDF not only aﬀect expected returns
on the asset and liability returns of an individual country, they also aﬀect expected returns across
countries. In short, Kt+1 is a world SDF than ties the behavior of returns together across countries.
At this point it may appear that little has been achieved by imposing the restrictions in (13)
because the exact determinants of the world SDF have yet to be specified. However, these restrictions
greatly simplify deriving an expression for a country’s NFA position that can be used empirically. I
derive this expression next, before considering the determinants of the SDF.
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Net Foreign Asset Positions
To determine a simple expression for a country’s’ NFA position, I first multiply both sides of the
budget constraint in (1) by the SDF and then take conditional expectations. This produces
Et [Kt+1NFAn,t+1] = Et [Kt+1(Xn,t+1  Mn,t+1)]
+ Et
⇥Kt+1Rfan,t+1⇤FAn,t   Et ⇥Kt+1Rfln,t+1⇤FLn,t
= Et [Kt+1(Xn,t+1  Mn,t+1)] +NFAn,t.
Rearranging this expression and solving forward using the Law of Iterated Expectations we obtain
NFAn,t = Et
1X
i=1
Dt+i (Mn,t+i  Xn,t+i) + Et lim
i!1
Dt+iNFAn,t+i, (9)
where Dt+i =
Qi
j=1Kt+j . Equation (9) diﬀers from the forward-looking expression for the NFA ratio
derived above in Section 2 in several important respects. First the discount factor used to discount
future trade deficits depends only on the world SDF, and so is the same for all countries at a point
in time. Second, there are no longer any terms involving (excess) portfolio returns. Expectations
concerning future returns still aﬀect a country’s NFA position, but the eﬀects work through the
SDF, as I explain below.
The last term on the right-hand-side on (9) identifies the expected present value of the country’s
net asset position as the horizon rises without limit using a discount factor determined by the world’s
SDF. To rule out Ponzi-schemes, I assume that
Et lim
i!1
Dt+iNFAn,t+i = 0, (10)
for all countries n.
To understand the economics behind this restriction, suppose a debtor country (i.e. a country
with NFAn,t < 0) decides to simply roll over existing asset and liability positions while running zero
future trade balances. Under these circumstances, the country’s asset and liability portfolios evolve
as FAn,t+i = Rfan,t+iFAn,t+i 1 and FLn,t+i = Rfln,t+iFLn,t+i 1 for all i > 0. Since Et[Kt+1Xt+1]
identifies the period t value of any period t+1 payoﬀ Xt+1, the value of claim to the country’s net
assets next period is
Et [Kt+1NFAn,t+1] = Et
⇥Kt+1(Rfan,t+1FAn,t  Rfln,t+1Fln,t)⇤
= Et
⇥Kt+1Rfan,t+1⇤FAn,t   Et ⇥Kt+1Rfln,t+1⇤FLn,t
= NFAn,t
This same reasoning applies in all future periods, i.e., Et+i [Kt+i+1NFAn,t+i+1] = NFAn,t+i for all
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i > 0, so the value of a claim to the foreign asset position ⌧ periods ahead is
Et [Dt+⌧NFAn,t+⌧ ] = Et [Dt+⌧ 1E⌧ 1 [Kt+⌧NFAn,t+⌧ ]]
= Et [Dt+⌧ 1NFAn,t+⌧ 1]
= ...
= NFAn,t.
Taking the limit as ⌧ ! 1 gives NFAn,t = Et limi!1 [Dt+iNFAn,t+i] < 0. Thus, the country’s
current net foreign asset position must be equal to the value of a claim on rolling the asset and liability
positions forward indefinitely into the future. Clearly then, no country n can unexpectedly initiate
a Ponzi scheme in period t when Et limi!1Dt+iNFAn,t+i   0. Moreover, since
P
nNFAn,t = 0 by
market clearing, if Et limi!1Dt+iNFAn˜,t+i > 0 for any one country, n˜, then at least one other must
be involved in a Ponzi scheme. Thus, the restriction in (10) prevents any country from unexpectedly
adopting a Ponzi scheme in period t.
What about contingent future Ponzi schemes? Suppose, for example, that the country intends
to start a scheme in t+1 if NFAn,t+1 < 0. In this situation, Rfan,t+1FAn,t Rfln,t+1FLn,t+Xn,t+1 <
Mn,t+1 so the funds available in period t+1 from exports and liquidating asset and liability positions
are insuﬃcient to pay for imports. Thus, the scheme can only be implemented if foreigners can be
induced to hold newly issued debt. This will be impossible if the foreigners are rational because the
value of a claim on country’s future net assets is Et+1 limi!1 [Dt+iNFAn,t+i] = NFAn,t+1 < 0.
Clearly, this argument applies to contingency plans at all future dates. In sum, therefore, the no-
arbitrage conditions in (8) ensure that no rational foreigners would be willing participants in any
contingent future Ponzi scheme.
We can now identify the determinants of a county’s NFA position by combining (9) and the
no-Ponzi restriction (10):
NFAn,t = Et
1X
i=1
Dt+i (Mn,t+i  Xn,t+i) . (11)
This expression states that in the absence of Ponzi schemes and arbitrage opportunities, the NFA
position of any country n should equal the expected present discounted value of future trade deficits,
discounted at the cumulated world SDF. Notice, also, that (11) is exact (i.e., it contains no approx-
imations). It must hold under the stated conditions for accurate NFA and trade data given market
expectations and the world SDF.
Equation (11) has several important economic implications. First, it implies that small countries
can only be current net international debtors if they are expected to run trade surpluses at some
point in the future. In particular, when NFAn,t < 0, there must be some future horizons j for
which Et[Dt+j(Mn,t+j  Xn,t+j)] < 0. This condition simplifies to Et[Dt+j ]Et[Mn,t+j  Xn,t+j ] < 0
in small countries where the trade balance is driven by idiosyncratic factors that are uncorrelated
with the world SDF. Consequently, Et[Xn,t+j  Mn,t+j ] > 0 for some horizon j because Dt+j is
a positive random variable. In contrast, large countries can be debtors without prospective future
trade surpluses provided the surpluses are negatively correlated with the world SDF. In these cases
the requirement that Et[Dt+j(Mn,t+j   Xn,t+j)] < 0 holds for some horizon j can be satisfied if
Et[Mn,t+j  Xn,t+j ] has an upper bounded of  CVt[Mn,t+j  Xn,t+j ,Dt+j ]/Et[Dt+j ] > 0.
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The second implication concerns the eﬀects of portfolio choice. In Section 2 we saw that com-
position of a country’s asset and liability portfolios could aﬀect its NFA position via the expected
future excess portfolio returns on assets and liabilities. Equation (11) limits these financial aﬀects.
If the equilibrium returns on individual securities are unaﬀected by a particular country’s choice
of portfolio, then the choice cannot aﬀect the world SDF. Under these circumstances, (11) implies
that choice of portfolio has no eﬀect on the country’s net foreign asset position. Conversely, if a
country’s choice of asset portfolio (say) aﬀects world returns in a manner that is reflected in the
world SDF, those choices will aﬀect NFA positions across the world because the same world SDF is
used to discount future trade deficits of every country.
Equation (11) also takes explicit account of risk. It states that a country’s NFA position is
equal to the value of a claim to the future stream of trade deficits in a world where those deficits are
uncertain. This is not the same a discounting future trade deficits by the expected path of the risk free
rate. By definition, the risk free return, Rrft is equal to 1/EtKt+1, so Kt+1 = 1Rrft +(Kt+1 EtKt+1).
We can therefore rewrite the discount factor in (11) as
Dt+i =
iY
j=1
(
1
Rrft 1+j
+ (Kt+j   Et+j 1Kt+j)
)
.
In a world without risk future deficits are discounted by the risk free rate because Kt+1 = EtKt+1.
However, (11) allows for the fact that variations in the world SDF are unpredictable so that un-
certainty about future deficits, risk free rates and the SDF must be jointly accounted for in the
determination of a country’s NFA position.
Identifying the World SDF
In a fully specified theoretical model of the world economy the world SDF would be identified from
the equilibrium conditions governing investors’ portfolio and savings decisions. Fortunately, for
our purposes, we can avoid such a complex undertaking. Instead, I adopt a “reverse-engineering”
approach in which I construct a specification for the SDF that explains the behavior of a set of
returns; the returns on the asset and liability portfolios for the G7 countries. This approach is easy
to implement and allows us to transform (11) into an equation amenable to empirical analysis.
Let ert+1 denote a k ⇥ 1 vector of log excess portfolio returns, erit+1 = rit+1   rtbt+1, where rit+1
denotes the log return on portfolio i and rtbt+1 is the log return on U.S. T-bills. I assume that the
log of the SDF, t+1 = lnKt+1, is determined as
t+1 = a  rtbt+1   b0(ert+1   E[ert+1]), (12)
where E[.] denotes the unconditional expectations operator. This specification for the SDF contains
k + 1 parameters: the constant a and the k ⇥ 1 vector b. In the “reverse-engineering” approach
values for these parameters are chosen to ensure that the no-arbitrage conditions are satisfied for
the specified SDF. More specifically, here I find values for a and b such that the portfolio returns
for the asset and liability portfolios of the G7 countries and the U.S. T-bill rate all satisfy the
no-arbitrage conditions.
Consider the condition for the i0th portfolio return: 1 = Et[exp(t+1 + rit+1)]. Taking uncondi-
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tional expectations we can rewrite this condition as
1 = E[exp(t+1 + rit+1)]
' exp  E[t+1 + rit+1] + 12V[t+1 + rit+1]  , (13)
where V[.] denotes the unconditional variance. When the log returns are normally distributed the
second line holds with equality because (12) implies that t+1 and rit+1are jointly normal. Otherwise,
the second line includes an approximation error.8
Next, I substituting for the log SDF from (12) in (13) and take logs to give
0 = a+ E
⇥
rit+1   rtbt+1
⇤
+ 12V
⇥
rit+1   rtbt+1   b0(ert+1   E[ert+1])
⇤
,
or, after some re-arrangement
a+ E
⇥
erit+1
⇤
+ 12V
⇥
erit+1
⇤
+ 12b
0V [ert+1] b = CV
⇥
erit+1, er
0
t+1
⇤
b, (14)
where CV[., .] denotes the unconditional covariance. This equation must hold for the T-bill rate (i.e.,
when rit+1 = rtbt+1, or erit+1 = 0 ) so
a+ 12b
0V [ert+1] b = 0. (15)
Imposing this restriction on (14) gives
E
⇥
erit+1
⇤
+ 12V
⇥
erit+1
⇤
= CV
⇥
erit+1, er
0
t+1
⇤
b.
This equation holds for each of the k portfolio returns. So stacking the k equations we obtain
E [ert+1] + 12⇤ = ⌦b, (16)
where ⌦ = V[ert+1] and ⇤ is a k ⇥ 1 vector containing the leading diagonal of ⌦.
Finally, we can solve (15) and (16) to give
a =   12b0⌦b and b = ⌦ 1µ with µ = E [ert+1] + 12⇤.
Substituting the solutions for a and b in (12) produces the following expression for the log SDF:
t+1 =   12µ0⌦ 1µ  rtbt+1   µ0⌦ 1(ert+1   E[ert+1]). (17)
By construction, equation (17) identifies a specification for the log SDF such that the uncondi-
tional no-arbitrage condition, 1 = E[exp(t+1 + rt+1)], holds for the k log portfolio returns and the
return on U.S. T-bills. This specification would also satisfy the conditional no-arbitrage condition,
1 = Et[exp(t+1 + rt+1)], if log returns were independently and identically distributed. However,
since this is not the case, we need to amend the specification to incorporate conditioning information.
Fortunately, this is quite straightforward.
8For the sake of clarity, I ignore the approximation error in the discussion below. I consider its empirical significance
in Section 5.
-20-
Consider the no-arbitrage condition (with conditional expectations) for portfolio return i :
1 = Et[exp(t+1 + rit+1)].
Let zt be a valid instrument known to market participants in period t. Multiplying both sides of
the no-arbitrage expression above by exp(zt) and taking unconditional expectations produces
E[exp(zt)] = E
⇥
exp(t+1 + r
i
t+1 + zt)
⇤
,
or, after some re-arrangement
1 = E
h
exp(t+1 + r
i,z
t+1)
i
, (18)
where ri,zt+1 = rit+1 + zt   lnE[exp(zt)]. Notice that (18) takes the same form as (13) used in the
constructions of the log SDF in (17). The only diﬀerence is that (18) contains the adjusted log
return on portfolio i, ri,zt+1, rather than the unadjusted return rit+1. This means that we can reverse
engineer a specification for the log SDF that incorporates the conditioning information if we add
adjusted log returns to the set of returns. Specifically, let eri,z
j
t+1 = r
i
t+1   rtbt+1 + zjt   lnE[exp(zjt )]
denote the log excess adjusted return on portfolio i using instrument zjt . If ert+1 now represents
a vector containing erit+1 and er
i,zj
t+1, the log SDF identified in (17) will satisfy the non-arbitrage
condition
1 = E
h
exp(t+1 + r
i
t+1)|zjt
i
,
for all the portfolio returns i and instruments zjt included in ert+1.
Three aspects of this reverse engineering procedure deserve comment. First, equation (17) doesn’t
necessarily identify a unique SDF that satisfies the no-arbitrage conditions for a set of returns.
Indeed, we know as a matter of theory that many SDF exist when markets are incomplete. Rather the
specification in (17) identifies one specification for the SDF that satisfies the no-arbitrage conditions.
Second, this reverse engineering approach makes no attempt to relate the SDF to underlying
macro factors. Obviously this would be a fatal drawback if our aim was to relate the behavior of
returns to macro variables (as general equilibrium asset pricing models do), but here we have a
much more modest aim of incorporating information from asset and liability returns with data from
trade flows to identify the determinants of a country’s NFA position. The present value expression
in (11) showed that information concerning prospective future returns only aﬀect a country’s NFA
position via the SDF, while (17) identifies a link between the SDF and returns that satisfy the no-
arbitrage conditions. If our goal is to understand how changes in prospective future returns aﬀect
NFA positions across the world, this specification for the SDF is all we need.
The third aspect concerns the use of instrumental variables to control for conditioning informa-
tion. In principle the conditional expectations of market participants that appear in the no-arbitrage
conditions equal expectations conditioned on every instrumental variable in their information set.
In practice, there is a limit to the number of instruments we want to incorporate into the log SDF
specification. Below I chose instruments that have forecasting power for log excess portfolio returns
and I consider the robustness of my results to alternative specifications of the log SDF based on
diﬀerent instrument choices.
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4 Empirical Implementation
I now combine the present value expression for the NFA position in (11) with the specification for
the log SDF in (17) to produce an equation that is amenable to empirical analysis. The challenge
here is in computing forecasts for Dt+iMn,t+i and Dt+iXn,t+i with Dt+i =
Qi
j=1 exp(t+j) for all
i > 0 from data on imports, exports and the returns that constitute the log SDF, t. To meet this
challenge, I use a standard approximation.
Approximating Net Foreign Asset Positions
To approximate the present value expression for each country’s NFA position, I first rewrite (11) as
NFAn,t = Mn,tEt
1X
i=1
exp
⇣Pi
j=1 mn,t+j + t+j
⌘
 Xn,tEt
1X
i=1
exp
⇣Pi
j=1 xn,t+j + t+j
⌘
. (19)
This transformation simply relates the NFA position to the current levels of imports and exports
and their future growth rates,  mn,t+i and  xn,t+i , rather than the future levels of exports and
imports shown in (11).
Next, I approximate to the two terms involving expectations. If  t is a random variable with
mean E[ t] =   < 0, then a first-order approximation to  t+j around   produces
Et
1X
i=1
exp
⇣Pi
j=1 t+j
⌘
= Et exp( t+1) + Et exp( t+1 +  t+2) + ...
' ⇢
1  ⇢ + ⇢Et( t+1    ) + ⇢
2Et( t+1    ) + ⇢3Et( t+2    ) + ....
=
⇢
1  ⇢ +
⇢
1  ⇢Et( t+1    ) +
⇢2
1  ⇢Et( t+2    ) + ...
=
⇢
1  ⇢ +
1
1  ⇢Et
1X
i=1
⇢i( t+i    ), (20)
where ⇢ = exp( ) < 1.
To apply this approximation, I make two assumptions:
E[ mn,t] = E[ xn,t] = g, and (A1)
g +  =   < 0, with E[t] = . (A2)
Under assumption A1 the mean growth rate for imports and exports are equal. This will be true
of any economy on a balanced growth path. It also appears consistent with the empirical evidence
for the the G7 countries. Table 1 showed that their sample means for  xn,t    mn,t are close to
zero. To interpret the assumption A2, note that in the steady state the log risk free rate r satisfies
1 = E[exp(t)] exp(r). Thus   = g +  ' g   r   12V[t], so A2 will hold provided V[t] > 2(g   r).
Recall the mean growth rate for trade across the countries in the dataset is approximately 6.5
percent, which is well above any reasonable estimate of the mean risk free rate of close to 1 percent.
Clearly then, A2 will only hold if the variance of the log SDF exceeds roughly 0.11 = 2(0.065 0.01).
This volatility bound is easily exceeded by estimates of the log SDF based on (17) derived below.
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Applying the approximation in (20) to the expectations terms in (19) and simplifying the result
gives
NFAn,t =
⇢
1 ⇢ (Mn,t  Xn,t) + 12(1 ⇢) (Mn,t +Xn,t)Et
1X
i=1
⇢i ( mn,t+i   xn,t+i)
+ 11 ⇢ (Mn,t  Xn,t)Et
1X
i=1
⇢i ( ⌧n,t+i   g)
+ 11 ⇢ (Mn,t  Xn,t)Et
1X
i=1
⇢i (t+i   ) , (21)
where  ⌧n,t = 12 ( mn,t +  xn,t). This expression identifies the three sets of factors determining
a country’s NFA position in a clear fashion. The first term on the right-hand-side identifies the
influence of the current trade balance. This would be the only factor determining the NFA posi-
tion in the stochastic steady state where import growth, export growth and the log SDF followed
i.i.d. processes because the terms involving expectations would equal zero. As such, this first term
identifies the atemporal influence of trade flows in the NFA position. The remaining terms of the
right-hand-side identify the intertemporal factors that were present in (11). Consider, for example,
news that leads agents to revise their forecasts for future trade deficits upwards. If trade is currently
balance (i.e., Mn,t = Xn,t) the news must also raise their forecasts of future import growth relative
to export growth so the second term on the right of (21) increases. The news may also induce
a revision in expected future trade growth,  ⌧n,t+i, if trade is currently unbalanced, producing a
change in the third term as well.
The last term on the right-hand-side of (21) identifies how news concerning the future SDF aﬀects
a country’s NFA position. To illustrate the economic intuition behind this term, consider the eﬀect
of news that lowers agents’ forecasts of the future SDF but leaves their forecasts for future trade
flows unchanged. Under these circumstances, future trade deficits are discounted more heavily so the
country’s current NFA position is more closely tied to the value of a claim on its near term deficits.
Thus the NFA positions of countries currently currently running trade deficits deteriorates (i.e., their
positive NFA positions fall towards zero), while the NFA positions of those running current trade
surpluses improve (i.e. their negative positions rise towards zero) as indicated by the last term in
(21). Notice, also, that such news aﬀects the NFA positions of all countries because (in the absence
of arbitrage) they all use the same SDF to discount future trade deficits, but the change in each
country’s NFA position depends on their current trade balance.
We can use (21) to identify a measure of a country’s external position that is comparable across
countries. For this purpose, I define country n0s external position by
NXAn,t =
NFAn,t
Mn,t +Xn,t
  ⇢
1  ⇢TDn,t where TDn,t =
Mn,t  Xn,t
Mn,t +Xn,t
.
In words, the country’s NXA position is defined as the gap between its current NFA position and
the steady state present value of the future trade deficits, all normalized by the current volume of
international trade. The rationale behind this definition is easily seen by substituting for NFAn,t
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from (21):
NXAn,t =
1
2(1 ⇢)Et
1X
i=1
⇢i ( mn,t+i   xn,t+i)
+ 11 ⇢TDn,tEt
1X
i=1
⇢i ( ⌧n,t+i   g) + 11 ⇢TDn,tEt
1X
i=1
⇢i (t+i   ) . (22)
Notice that the none of the terms on the right-hand-side should be systematically related to country
n0s level of GDP. For example, the second and third terms include the ratio of the country’s current
trade deficit to the volume of trade, TDn,t, a ratio that must lie between -1 and +1. This means that
cross-country comparisons of NXAn,t can be meaningfully interpreted in terms of the diﬀerences
in current trade ratios and forecasts for future growth in trade flows. Equation (22) also makes
clear that the NXA measure of any country’s external position will be (approximately) zero in the
steady state where agents’ forecasts for future import growth, export growth and the log SDF are
equal to their unconditional means. Of course market clearing ensures that
X
n
NFAn,t = 0 andX
n
(Mn,t   Xn,t) = 0 so aggregating the NXA measure across countries gives a world external
position of zero; i.e.,
X
n
NXAn,t = 0.
Figure 4 plots the NFA positions and trade deficits as a fraction of annual trade for each of the
countries in the data set between 1980 and 2011. The left-hand panels show that NFA positions vary
between ± 300 percent of trade. This is more than twice the size of the range for the NFA to GDP
ratios shown in Figure 1. The plots in the right-hand panels show that trade deficits vary between ±
20 per cent of trade - a range comparable to the net export to GDP ratios. Figure 5 plots the NXA
positions for each country in the dataset between 1980 and 2011. These NXA values are computed
using a value for ⇢ of 0.586. I describe how this value for ⇢ is estimated from the data in Section 5.
The left-hand panel in Figure 5 shows that the NXA measures for all but one of the G7 countries
have remained between ±1 during the past 30 years. The one exception is the Japanese NXA series,
which persistently increased from 0.1 to 2.6 during the period. Variations in the NXA positions of
countries outside the G7 are generally larger. The plots in the right-hand panel of Figure 5 show large
improvements in the external positions of India and South Korea while Australia’s NXA position
has remained largely unchanged. It is also interesting to note that the steady improvement in the
NXA position of China in the last twenty years is not nearly as pronounced as the improvement in
Japan’s position.
In Section 5 I use (21), (22) and time series forecasts for trade flows and the log SDF to study
the evolution of the NXA positions shown in Figure 5. Before turning to this analysis, it is worth
emphasizing that these equations are not derived from counterfactual assumptions concerning the
evolution of the world economy. More specifically, the accuracy of the approximations in (21) and
(22) are not compromised by the fact that on average both trade growth and position growth far
exceed the rate of GDP growth across countries. Moreover (21) and (22) apply to each country’s
whole NFA and NXA positions, not the positions relative to a secular trend. As was clear from the
NFA plots in Figure 1, most movements in NFA positions are very persistent, so there is a significant
advantage in studying the dynamics of whole NFA and NXA positions rather than their de-trended
components. That said, accounting for the diverse NXA paths plotted in Figure 5 represents a
significant challenge.
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Figure 4: Net Foreign Assets and Net Exports
A: Net Foreign Assets (% of Trade) B: Trade Deficits (% of Trade )
C: Net Foreign Assets (% of Trade) B: Trade Deficits (% of Trade )
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Figure 5: NXA Positions
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Sustainability
The question of whether a country’s current external position is sustainable occupies a central
position in international policy discussions. Equation (11) and the approximations in (21) and (22)
enable us to make the notion of sustainability precise.
Equation (11) and the approximations in (21) and (22) are based on two economic assumptions:
(i) that portfolio returns on assets and liabilities satisfy the no-arbitrage conditions; and (ii) that
investors are unwilling to participate in Ponzi schemes. These two assumptions are necessary con-
ditions for any meaningful definition of sustainability. To see why, suppose that a country’s NXA
position was based on the assumption that it could make a riskless profit in the future from issu-
ing liabilities and investing the proceeds in a foreign asset market. Clearly this is an implausible
assumption unless there is a credible reason for the asset market to remain closed to all but the
country’s investors. Lacking such a reason, the prospect of future riskless profits sustaining the cur-
rent NFA positions would disappear as the asset market opened to investors from around the world
attempting to profit from the arbitrage opportunity. Similarly, a country’s NFA position could only
be supported by running a Ponzi scheme while there are enough foreign investors willing to purchase
the country’s liabilities (at a positive price). In this case sustaining such a position indefinitely is
implausible because the foreign investors are acting against their own self-interest.
Not all NXA positions consistent with (22) need be sustainable. In principle there exists a set
of expectations concerning future paths for trade flows and the SDF that make the right-hand-
side of (22) equal to the value of any NXA position. Thus, any precise notion of sustainability
requires restrictions on these expectations in addition to the no-arbitrage and on-Ponzi conditions.
Of course these restrictions arise naturally in theoretical models with rational expectations. Here
agents’ expectations are restricted to conditional expectations based on the true distribution of future
equilibrium trade flows and SDFs, so they guarantee sustainability: Unexpected future changes in
the NXA position are driven entirely by shocks that induce revisions in equilibrium expectations.
And, in the absence of shocks, the NXA position converges to its steady state value of zero.
Judging the sustainability of an actual country’s external position is more complicated because
any judgement must be conditioned on a particular set of expectations concerning the future SDF
and trade flows. To understand the issues involved, consider judgements that utilize (22). This
equation contains expectations conditioned on the common information set of agents in period t.
Since much of this information is unavailable to analysts, we must “condition down” from agents’
common information before the equation can be used.
Let  t denote a subset of agents’ information at t that includes NXAn,t and TDn,t. Taking
expectations conditioned on  t on both sides of (22) and applying the Law of Iterated Expectations,
we find that
NXAn,t =
1
2(1 ⇢)
1X
i=1
⇢iE [( mn,t+i   xn,t+i) | t]
+ 11 ⇢TDn,t
1X
i=1
⇢iE [( ⌧n,t+i   g) | t] + 11 ⇢TDn,t
1X
i=1
⇢iE [(t+i   ) | t] ,
or, more compactly,
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NXAn,t =
1
2PV( mn,t   xn,t) + TDn,tPV( ⌧n,t   g) + TDn,tPV(t   ), (23)
where PV( t) = 11 ⇢
P1
i=1 ⇢
iE [ t+i| t]. This equation takes the same form as (22) except the
agents’ expectations are replaced by expectations conditioned on  t. Conditioning down in this
manner doesn’t aﬀect the link between the country’s external position and the expectations because
information used by agents is eﬀectively contained in  t via the presence of NXAn,t and TDn,t.
Judging sustainability with the aid of (23) is conceptually straightforward. All we need do
is compare the actual value of NXAn,t with the valued implied by the right-hand-side that use
estimates of the conditional expectations terms and its associated confidence band that accounts for
estimation (and approximation) error. If the value for NXAn,t falls within this band, there is no
evidence against the sustainability of the country’s external position. Alternatively, if NXAn,t falls
outside the band, there is a prima facie case the the country is on an unsustainable path. In these
circumstances the question of whether the country’s external position is truly sustainable requires
further judgement. In particular, we would want to asses whether the confidence band computed
for the right-hand-side of (23) covers the range of economically plausible expectations agents could
hold concerning future trade flows and the SDF.
Three features of (23) simplify such an assessment. First, the right-hand-side involves ex-
pectations concerning the export-import diﬀerential,  xn,t    mn,t, and trade growth,  ⌧n,t =
1
2 ( mn,t +  xn,t). These variables display little serial correlation (see Table 1) and are hard to
forecast using historical data, so the plausible range of agents’ expectations for these terms is tightly
bound by historical norms. Second, agents’ expectations concerning the future log SDF aﬀect the
NXA positions of all countries. If the NXA positions of other countries fall with the confidence
bands computed from estimates of E[t+i   | t], it is unlikely that agents’ expectations diﬀer sig-
nificantly from these estimates. Finally, all the estimated expectations on the right-hand-side of (23)
are discounted by ⇢ = exp(g + ), where g = E[ mn,t] = E[ xn,t] and  = E[t]. I estimate the
value for ⇢ to be approximately 0.6 using sample moments from 12 countries over 40 years. This
estimate implies that agents’ short-horizon expectations concerning future trade flows and the SDF
are quantitatively far more important than their medium- or long-horizon expectations in determin-
ing NXAn,t. Thus, when contemplating the plausible range for agents’ expectations we can focus
primarily on their short-term expectations.
A country’s external position should be view as unsustainable in cases where the value of NXAn,t
falls outside the confidence band that is judged wide enough to cover the range of economically
plausible expectations agents could hold. To be clear, in these cases the current value of the country’s
asset and liability portfolios are viewed as inconsistent with the plausible prospects for future trade
flows and the SDF. For example, in the case of a net debtor country, the value of its liabilities
may reflect overoptimism concerning future export growth; i.e. agents expectations Et xn,t+i are
implausibly high. Such a country would be judged to be in an unsustainable position because at some
point the overoptimism will evaporate and the price of the country’s liabilities will collapse (including
the possibility of a default on its debt). This “adjustment” process will raise the future value of
NXAn,t to a sustainable level, i.e., a level consistent with economically plausible expectations for
trade and the SDF going forward.
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Forecasts
In principle, the analysis described above can be conducted using estimates of expectations computed
in a variety of ways. For example, policymakers might want to combine forecasts from several policy
models and/or statistical forecasting models. In this paper I compute estimates of the present value
terms on the right-hand-side of (23) from VARs. This approach follows a large literature initiated
by the work of Campbell and Shiller (1987).
Specifically, let the vector zn,t = [  mn,t   xn,t, ⌧n,t   gˆ, NXAn,t, TDn,t, .. ]0 follow a p0th.
order VAR:
zn,t = a1zn,t 1 + a2zn,t 2 + ....akzn,t p + un,t,
where ai are matrices of coeﬃcients from each of the VAR equations, and un,t is a vector of mean-
zero shocks. gˆ denotes the pooled sample mean for trade growth across countries. To compute
the first two present value terms on the right-hand-side of (23), the estimated VAR is written in
companion form: 2666664
zn,t
...
...
zn,t p+1
3777775 =
266664
aˆ1 · · · · · · aˆp
I
. . .
I 0
377775
2666664
zn,t 1
...
...
zn,t p
3777775+
266664
un,t
0
...
0
377775 ,
or, more compactly,
Zn,t = AˆnZn,t 1 + Un,t,
where aˆi are the matrices of estimated coeﬃcients. The present value terms are then computed as
dPV( mn,t   xn,t) = ⇢1 ⇢ ı1Aˆn(I   ⇢Aˆn) 1Zn,t and (24)dPV( ⌧n,t   g) = ⇢1 ⇢ ı2Aˆn(I   ⇢Aˆn) 1Zn,t (25)
where ı1 and ı2 are vectors that pick out the first and second rows of Zn,t: i.e.,  mn,t  xn,t = ı1Zn,t
and  ⌧n,t  gˆ = ı2Zn,t. These calculations are computed from VAR’s estimated country-by-country,
and thus allow for cross-country diﬀerences in the present value terms. The present value term
involving the log SDF is common to all countries and so is calculated in an analogous fashion from
a single VAR for that includes t   ˆ, as
dPV(t   ˆ) = ⇢1 ⇢ ı1Aˆ(I   ⇢Aˆ) 1Zt, (26)
where t   ˆ = ı1Zt and ˆ is the sample average of the log SDF. The calculations in (24)-(26) use
a value for ⇢ equal to exp(gˆ + ˆ).
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5 Empirical Analysis
Estimating the World SDF
I consider two specifications for the log SDF. The first, denoted by ˆit, is estimated from (17) using
the portfolio returns on assets and liabilities for the G7 and the real return on U.S. T-bills as the
set of returns. This specification doesn’t incorporate conditioning information. To assess whether
the estimates satisfy the no-arbitrage condition, 1 = E[exp(ˆit+1 + rit+1)|zjt ], I estimate regressions
of the form:
exp(ˆit+1 + r
i
t+1)  1 = b1(fan,t   fln,t) + b2(xn,t  mn,t) + vt+1. (27)
Panel A of Table 3 reports the estimation results for the log returns on the asset and liability
portfolios of the G7 countries. Notice that the log ratios of assets-to-liabilities and export-to-imports
are valid instruments so the estimates of b1 and b2 should be statistically insignificant under the null
of a correctly specified SDF. As Panel A shows, this is not the case for the portfolio returns of four
countries. The log asset-to-liability ratio has predictive power for German, U.K. and U.S. returns,
while the log export-to-import ratio has power for the returns on Japanese assets.
Table 3: Forecasting Returns
Asset Returns Liability Returns
b1 b2 R2 b1 b2 R2
A: ˆi
France 0.059 -0.210 -0.001 0.117 -0.205 0.003
Germany -0.428⇤ 0.669 0.124 -0.442⇤⇤ 0.594 0.129
Italy -1.031 2.436 0.135 -1.009 2.667⇤ 0.143
Japan 0.299 2.304⇤⇤ 0.098 0.327 2.374 0.106
United Kingdom -5.852⇤⇤ 0.324 0.183 -5.843⇤⇤ 0.437 0.177
United States -1.108⇤⇤ 0.216 0.132 -1.059⇤⇤ 0.252 0.115
B: ˆii
France -0.188 -0.636 0.023 -0.116 -0.610 0.017
Germany -0.083 2.824 0.057 -0.091 2.862 0.059
Italy -0.653 -0.668 0.018 -0.653 -0.453 0.016
Japan 0.742 1.809 0.050 0.774 1.874 0.055
United Kingdom -4.595 2.237 0.052 -4.698 2.529 0.054
United States -0.229 0.515 0.022 -0.163 0.558 0.023
Notes: The table reports the OLS estimates of the regression (27) using the SDFI in panel
A and SDFII in panel B. “⇤⇤” and “⇤” indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. All regression estimated in annual data between 1971 and 2011.
In the light of these results, I incorporate conditioning information in my second specification
for the log SDF, denoted by ˆiit . Specifically, I now add the adjusted log return on U.S. assets,
ri,zt+1 = r
a
us,t+1 + (faus,t   flus,t)   lnE[exp(faus,t   flus,t)], where raus,t+1 is the log return on U.S.
assets, to the set of returns used to estimate the log SDF in (17). This specification incorporates
information concerning the future value of the SDF that is correlated with variations in the U.S.
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NFA position. Thus, faus,t   flus,t should not have forecasting power for exp(ˆiit+1 + rit+1)   1
by construction. To check whether the other instruments retain their forecasting power, I then re-
estimate regression (27) with ˆiit+1 replacing ˆit+1. Panel B of Table 3 reports these regression results.
In contrast to Panel A, none of the b1 and b2 coeﬃcient estimates are statistically significant. Notice,
also, that the R2 statistics are (in most cases) an order of magnitude smaller than their counterparts
in Panel A. The asset-to-liability and export-to-import ratios do not account for an economically
meaningful fraction of the variation in exp(ˆiit+1 + rit+1)   1. These findings appear robust to the
choice of estimation period and instruments. Re-estimating (27) over a sample period that ends in
2007 gives essentially the same results. I also find statistically insignificant coeﬃcients in regressions
using ˆiit+1 as the log SDF when GDP growth rates and/or lagged returns are used as alternate
instruments.9
Figure 6 plots the two estimated SDFs, Kˆit = exp(ˆit) and Kˆiit = exp(ˆiit ), together with the inverse
of the real return on U.S. T-bills, 1/Rtbt . In the special case where the expected excess portfolio
returns on assets and liabilities are zero, equation (17) implies that the SDF is equal to 1/Rtbt . Thus
diﬀerences between 1/Rtbt and the estimated SDF’s arise because the SDFs must account for the
expected excess portfolio returns. As the plots clearly show, both estimates of the SDF are more
volatile than 1/Rtbt . In fact, variations in the log real return on U.S. T-bills contribute less than
one percent to the sample variance of ˆit and ˆiit . Thus, changes in U.S. T-bill returns do not appear
to have an economically significant impact on estimates of the SDF that “explain” excess returns on
asset and liability portfolios in the G7. The plots in Figure 6 also show that there are numerous
episodes where the estimates SDFs are well above one. Ex ante, the conditionally expected value of
the SDF, EtKt+1, identifies the value of a claim to one real dollar next period. So safe dollar assets
sold at a premium during periods where these high values for the SDF were forecast ex ante.
While the time series for Kˆiit and 1/Rtbt in Figure 6 look very diﬀerent, the unconditional moments
of Kˆiit and Rtbt are closely related. Let r denote the log risk free rate in the steady state that satisfies
the no-arbitrage condition 1 = E[exp(t + r)] = E[exp(t)] exp(r). After substituting for t from
(17) and evaluating the expectation with a log-normal approximation, we can rewrite this condition
as
r =  E[t]  12V[t] = E [rtbt ]  12V (rtbt )  CV [rtbt , er0t]⌦ 1µ.
Thus, the steady state risk free rate is equal to the unconditional expected real return on U.S. T-bills
and a risk premium that accommodates variations in real returns and their co-variation with excess
portfolio returns.10 When the log SDF is identified by ˆiit , I estimate that the steady state risk free
rate equals 1.84 percent. By comparison, the average real return on U.S. T-bills is 1.54 percent, 30
basis points lower. Intuitively, the average return on U.S. T-bills is lower than the risk free rate
because the bonds provide unexpectedly large real returns when the realized value of the SDF is
high; i.e., a hedge against “bad” states of the world where agents are willing to pay a premium for
safe dollar assets.
Finally, the estimates of the log SDF, ˆiit , allow us to pin down the discount rate ⇢ = exp(g +
9Recall that specification for t in (17) was derived using a log normal approximation to evaluate expected future
returns. Based of these regression estimates, there is no evidence to suggest that the approximation is a significant
source of specification error for ˆiit .
10Strictly speaking, the variance term arises from Jensen’s inequality because we are working with log returns on
T-bills, so is not part of the risk premium per se. Nevertheless, I follow the common practice of including the variance
term when referring to the risk premium.
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Figure 6: SDF Estimates
Notes: The figure plots two estimates of the world SDF, Kˆit = exp(ˆit) and Kˆiit = exp(ˆiit ), with t
determined in (17); and the inverse of the real return on U.S. T-bills, 1/Rtbt .
) used in computing the present value terms in the NXA equation (23). Recall that g is the
unconditional growth rate for exports and imports, estimated to be 0.064 from the pooled average
of import and export growth across countries. My estimate of  computed from the average value
of ˆiit is approximately -0.59. Together, these estimates imply a discount rate of ⇢ = 0.586. This is
the value I use below when constructing the NXA measures of each country’s external position and
computing the present value expressions in the NXA equations.
Forecasting Trade and the SDF
According to the analytic framework developed in Section 3, forecasts of future trade flows are
embedded in each country’s external position. In particular, equation (23) showed how the NXA
position of a country was related to the present value of the import-export growth diﬀerential,
PV( mn,t    xn,t), and trade growth, PV( ⌧n,t   g). Evidence concerning the time series pre-
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dictability of these variables is presented in Table 4. Here I report the estimates from two regressions:
 mn,t+1   xn,t+1 = c0 + c1(xn,t  mn,t   bµn) + c2( mn,t   xn,t) + vn,t+1 (28)
and  ⌧n,t+1   g = d0 + d1(xn,t  mn,t   µˆn) + d2( ⌧n,t   g) + vn,t+1, (29)
where µˆn denotes the sample average of xn,t mn,t. The left-hand-panel of the table shows that there
is a good deal of time series predictability in the import-export growth diﬀerential. In all but four
countries, the estimates of c1 are positive and statistically significant. Thus, future imports tend to
grow at a faster rate than exports when the log export-to-import ratio is above its historical norm
(i.e., µˆn). This pattern of predictability is consistent with the presence of cointegration between
xn,t and mn,t. Lagged import-export growth also has predictive power in the case of the United
States and China. The estimates of regression (29) reported in the right-hand panel show much less
evidence of predictability in trade growth. In only two countries, Australia and India, are any of the
slope coeﬃcients statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Based on these results, I estimate the present value terms involving future trade flows in the
NXA equation from VARs that include the import-export growth diﬀerential,  mn,t  xn,t, trade
growth,  ⌧n,t and the log export-to-import ratio, xn,t  mn,t. Consistent with equation (23), I also
include NXAn,t and the U.S. real T-bill rate, rtbt , although the results are robust with respect to the
presence or absence of these variables. Below I report results based on first-order VARs estimated
separately for each country, n. Alternatively, one could estimate the VAR coeﬃcients from the
pooled VAR, and then use the estimates in conjunction with the country-specific values for current
import-import growth, trade growth, etc..
I also use a VAR to compute the present value of the log SDF, dPV(ˆiit   ˆii). In this case the
VAR includes ˆiit , the U.S. T-bill rate, rtbt , the U.S. inflation rate, ⇡ust , the yield spread between the
yield on ten and one year U.S. T-bonds, sprust , and the average rate of real GDP growth across the
G7,  yG7t . Among these variables, most of the predictive power comes from the U.S. yield spread.
Higher values for the spread predict lower future values for the log SDF. I also use the VAR to
compute the present value of the log return on U.S. T-bills, dPV(rtbt   rˆtb), where rˆtb is the sample
average of rtbt . Here most of the predictive power of the VAR for future U.S. T-bill returns comes
from current returns.
Figure 7 plots the VAR-based estimates of the present value for the log SDF and minus one
times the present value of the log return on U.S. T-bills over the sample period. The VAR is
estimated using data between 1971 and 2011. Alternative estimates of the present value derived
from a VAR estimated on pre-crisis data (1971-2006) follow a similar pattern. As the figure clearly
shows, time series variations in the present value for the log SDF follow a cyclical pattern and are
much larger in magnitude than the changes in the present value of the log return on U.S. T-bills.
The diﬀerences between these series reflect the eﬀects of time-varying risk. To see why, consider
the no-arbitrage condition governing the return on U.S. T-bills: 1 = Et[exp(ˆiit+1 + rtbt+1)]. Using
a log-normal approximation to evaluate the conditional expectation, we can rewrite this condition
as Et[ˆiit+1 + rtbt+1] =   12Vt[ˆiit+1 + rtbt+1], where Vt[.] denotes the conditional variance. Subtracting
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Table 4: Forecasting Trade Flows
Export-Import Growth Trade Growth
c1 c2 R2 d1 d2 R2
Canada 9.095 0.275 0.108 10.845 0.089 0.080
France 19.963⇤⇤ 0.015 0.136 4.349 0.113 0.015
Germany 12.903⇤⇤ 0.119 0.103 -5.917 0.036 0.016
Italy 17.201⇤⇤ 0.134 0.126 -1.743 -0.045 0.003
Japan 15.729⇤⇤ 0.195 0.114 -9.487 -0.185 0.076
United Kingdom 10.169 0.229 0.091 1.890 0.165 0.028
United States 26.553⇤⇤ 0.663⇤⇤ 0.510 -4.950 0.031 0.018
Australia 8.058 0.039 0.033 4.276 -0.284⇤⇤ 0.130
China 46.757⇤⇤ 0.272⇤⇤ 0.309 14.897 0.282⇤ 0.106
India 13.477⇤⇤ 0.121 0.129 11.936⇤⇤ 0.153 0.147
South Korea 13.852⇤⇤ 0.070 0.151 -6.968 0.014 0.062
Thailand 11.297 -0.244 0.135 1.930 0.034 0.004
Notes: The left- and right-hand panels reports the OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcients
and the R2 statistics from regressions (28) and (29), respectively. Each row reports es-
timates for country n. “⇤⇤” and “⇤” indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions estimated in annual data between 1971 and 2011.
unconditional expectations from both sides and re-arranging using (17) gives
Et[ˆiit+1   ˆ] =  Et
⇥
rtbt+1   rˆtb
⇤  12 {Vt[b0ert+1]  E [Vt[b0ert+1]]} .
Thus a fall in the present value of the log SDF must reflect either a rise in the present value of the
log real return on U.S. T-bills and/or a rise in the conditional variance of future excess portfolio
returns on asset and liabilities across the G7. Similarly, a rise in the present value of the log SDF
must reflect a fall in the present value of the log real return on U.S. T-bills and/or a fall in the
conditional variance. With this perspective, the plots in Figure 7 clearly indicate that changes in
risk (as measured by the conditional variance) are the primary driver behind the cyclical variations
in the present value of the log SDF. For example, the sizable swings in the log SDF between 1998
and 2008 appear to reflect, in turn, an large rise, fall, and rise again in expectations concerning the
level of risk well into the future.
Cross-Country External Positions
The NXA equation derived in Section 4 has implications for both the cross-country distribution of
external positions at a point in time, and the variation in the positions of individual countries over
time. Here I examine the cross-country implications.
To begin, I consider the importance of intertemporal factors. Recall from equation (21) that the
net foreign asset position of any country will be proportional to its current trade balance when agents’
expect the future growth in exports, imports and trade to be at their steady state rates and they
expect the future log SDF to be equal to a constant. Under these circumstances intertemporal factors
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Figure 8: Intertemporal Trade and the Cross-Country Distribution of NXA
A: OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcient  t from regression
(30). Dashed lines indicate a two standard error bound around
the estimates.
C: OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcient  t from regression
(31). Dashed lines indicate a two standard error bound around
the estimates.
B: R2 from regression (30). D: R2 from regression (31).
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Next, I consider the role of intertemporal trade on the cross-country distribution of external
positions. For this purpose I estimate a series of cross-country regressions for the NXA positions on
the present value of the growth diﬀerentials between imports and and exports:
NXAn,t =  0,t +  t
⇣
1
2
dPV( mn,t   xn,t)⌘+ ⇠n,t, (31)
where dPV( mn,t    xn,t) are the VAR-based estimates of the present value described above. If
agents expectations concerning future trade growth and the log SDF equal their steady state values
(i.e. when Et ⌧t+i = g and Ett+i = ,) the cross-country distribution of NXA should only reflect
diﬀerences in the present value of the import-export growth diﬀerentials. Under this null,  t will
equal unity, and the R2 statistic from the regression should equal one for each year t. Panels C and
D of Figure 8 plot the estimates of  t and the R2 statistics from estimating (31). In this case the
estimates of  t are mostly positive or statistically insignificant, but the R2 statistics are generally
very small. These results suggest the cross-country diﬀerences in the prospective growth of imports
relative to exports typically account for only a small fraction of the cross-country distribution in
external positions.
In Figure 9 I examine how agents’ expectations concerning the future path for the log SDF
contribute to the cross-country distribution of returns. According to equation (23), NXAn,t  
1
2PV( mn,t    xn,t) = TDn,t[PV( ⌧n,t   g) + PV(t   )]. So, once we control for diﬀerences
in the present value of import-export growth diﬀerentials, any remaining cross-country diﬀerences
in external positions depend on current trade deficits, TDn,t, and agents’ expectations about trade
growth and the log SDF. Panels A and B of Figure 9 plot the estimates of  t and the R2 statistics
from regressions of the form:
NXAn,t   12dPV( mn,t   xn,t) =  0,t +  tTDn,t + ⇠n,t. (32)
If agents expectations concerning future trade growth are the same across countries,  t will identify
PV( ⌧n,t   g) + PV(t   ). In addition, we should expect to find R2 statistics close to one if the
VAR estimates of PV( mn,t  xn,t) accurately identify agents expectations for the future import-
export growth diﬀerentials. Panels A and B reveal two interesting features. First, the estimates of
 t are generally positive and rise steadily during the last decade of the sample. Second, there is a
marked rise in the R2 statistics after 2004, with a peak value of 0.72 in 2008. These results indicate
that a sizable portion of recent cross-country diﬀerences in external positions can be attributed to
expectations of higher-than-normal trade growth and/or the future path of log SDFs.
The plots in Panel C and D Figure 9 help disentangle these eﬀects. Here I plot the estimates of
 t and the R2 statistics from regressions:
NXAn,t   12dPV( mn,t   xn,t)  TDn,tdPV( ⌧n,t   g) =  0,t +  tTDn,t + ⇠n,t. (33)
Notice that in this case the estimates for  t identify the present value of agents’ expectations for the
future path of the SDF because the dependent variable controls for their expectations concerning
trade growth with the inclusion of TDn,tdPV( ⌧n,t   g). Comparing the left and right-hand panels
of Figure 9 we see similar patterns for the estimates of  t and the R2 statistics in the last decade
of the sample. In both cases, the estimates of  t are close to 10 by 2011 while the R2 statistics are
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Figure 9: Financial Factors and the Cross-Country Distribution of NXA
A: OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcient  t from regression
(32). Dashed lines indicate a two standard error bound around
the estimates.
C: OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcient  t from regression
(33). Dashed lines indicate a two standard error bound around
the estimates.
B: R2 from regression (32). D: R2 from regression (33).
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near 0.6. These results suggest that agents expectations concerning the future path of the log SDF
contribute significantly to the recent cross-country distribution of external positions.
External Position Dynamics
I now turn to the dynamic implications of the NXA equation in (23). Recall from Table 4 that the
future growth diﬀerential between imports and exports could be forecast by the current diﬀerential
and the log of the export-to-import ratio. Since these forecasts appear in the first present value
term on the right-hand-side of (23), the forecasting variables should also account for some of the
time series variations in NXAn,t. To investigate this possibility, I estimate time series regressions,
NXAn,t = a0 + a1(xn,t  mn,t   µˆn) + a2( mn,t   xn,t) + ⇣n,t, (34)
for each country n over the entire sample period (1971-2011). If variations in the forecasting variables
on the right-hand-side are correlated with changes in agents’ expectations in the present value,
PV( mn,t    xn,t), both a1 and a2 should be statistically significant. Panel A of Table 5 shows
that this is the case for the majority of countries in the dataset. Notice, also, that the estimates of
a1 are all positive except in the case of France. To interpret this finding, recall from Table 4 that
future imports tend to grow at a faster rate than exports when the log export-to-import ratio is
above its historical norm. Thus positive estimates of a1 are consistent with the idea that agents’
real-time expectations concerning future import and export growth in PV( mn,t  xn,t) adjust in
an analogous manner.
Table 5: External Positions with Trade Forecasts
A: B:
a1 a2 R2 ↵1 R2
Canada 0.740 1.400 0.040 5.979⇤⇤ 0.251
France -5.885⇤⇤ -6.342⇤⇤ 0.290 -15.588⇤⇤ 0.131
Germany 1.260⇤⇤ 0.801 0.411 5.820⇤⇤ 0.550
Italy 0.079 -0.328 0.008 2.751⇤⇤ 0.171
Japan 1.709⇤⇤ 1.418 0.177 6.785⇤⇤ 0.216
United Kingdom 2.940⇤⇤ 2.166⇤⇤ 0.653 9.434⇤⇤ 0.377
United States 2.011⇤⇤ 0.386 0.176 1.635 0.030
Australia 0.658⇤⇤ 0.446 0.104 0.578 0.007
China 2.622⇤⇤ 1.132⇤⇤ 0.580 4.222⇤⇤ 0.471
India 6.728⇤⇤ 4.551⇤⇤ 0.685 17.525⇤⇤ 0.324
South Korea 4.581⇤⇤ 3.714⇤⇤ 0.713 18.903⇤⇤ 0.650
Thailand 0.983⇤⇤ 0.455 0.405 3.517⇤⇤ 0.416
Notes: Panels A and B report OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcients and R2 statistics
from regressions (34) and (35), respectively. Each row reports estimates for country n.
“⇤⇤” and “⇤” indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All
regressions estimated in annual data between 1971 and 2011.
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Next, I compare the time series variation in each country’s NXA position with the variations in the
estimated present values of the future import-export growth diﬀerential,dPV( mn,t  xn,t). These
estimates are derived from (country-specific) VARs that include  mn,t   xn,t,  ⌧n,t, xn,t  mn,t,
rtbt and NXAn,t so they incorporate information about the future growth in trade flows from a larger
set of variables than regression (34). In Panel B of Table 4 I report the results from estimating
NXAn,t = ↵0 + ↵1dPV( mn,t   xn,t) + ⇣n,t, (35)
for each country n over the sample period. The estimates of ↵1 are positive and appear statistically
significant in nine of the twelve countries.12 The three exceptions are France, Australia and the
United States. In the French case the estimate of ↵1 is large and negative. This is a counterintuitive
result, but it is consistent with the estimates in Panel A. In the Australian and United States’
cases, the estimates of ↵1 are small and positive but the R2 statistics are very close to zero. For
the other countries changing expectations concerning the future growth in imports and exports act
as economically important driver of external positions. For example, the regressions for Germany,
China, South Korea and Thailand produce R2 statistics above 40 percent.
Table 6 shows how changes in expected future trade flows and the log SDF contribute to the
time series variation in external positions. Here I report the results from estimating
NXAn,t = ↵0 + ↵1dPV( mn,t   xn,t) + ↵2TDn,tdPV( ⌧n,t   g)
+ ↵3TDn,tdPV(t   ) + ⇣n,t, (36)
for each country n, over the sample period. Panel A reports results from estimating (36) with the
first two present value terms on the right-hand-side that identify the eﬀects of changing expectations
concerning future trade flows. Panel B reports the results from estimating the regression estimates
with all three present value terms and so includes the influence of changing expectations about the
future path for the SDF.
Table 6 contains several interesting results. First, variations in the expected future path of the
log SDF only appear to make a significant incremental contribution to the NXA dynamics of three
countries: Australia, Italy and the United States. In the Australian and Italian regressions, the
estimated ↵i coeﬃcients are positive and statistically significant and adding dPV(t   ) raises the
R2 statistics by an economically meaningful amount (i.e., 0.31 to 0.38 and 0.51 to 0.66, respectively).
In the U.S. case, variations in the expected future path of the log SDF appear as the most significant
driver of NXA dynamics. The estimates in panel A imply that expected future trade flows alone
account for almost none of the variations in NXA, whereas those in Panel B show that whendPV(t 
) is included in the regression the R2 rises to 0.34. Across the other countries, the R2 statistics
indicate that changing expectations concerning future trade flows account for sizable fractions of the
time series variations in the NXA positions. Moreover, since the estimates of ↵1 and ↵2 are mainly
positive and statistically significant, these variations are generally in the direction consistent with
the NXA expression in equation (23). South Korea and Thailand are exceptions. Here the estimates
of ↵2 are negative and significant.
12Accurate statistical inference here (and in Table 6 below) should account for the fact that dPV( mn,t  xn,t) is
a “generated regressor” derived from the VAR estimates. This requires computing bootstrap standard errors for the
estimates of ↵1, which I have not done.
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Table 6: External Positions with Trade and SDF Forecasts
A: B:
↵1 ↵2 R2 ↵1 ↵2 ↵3 R2
Canada 5.807⇤⇤ 0.417⇤⇤ 0.472 5.540⇤⇤ 0.417⇤⇤ 0.556 0.475
France -3.944 3.959⇤⇤ 0.590 -3.940 3.898⇤⇤ 1.128 0.591
Germany 5.588⇤⇤ -0.144 0.553 5.498⇤⇤ -0.194 -0.881 0.572
Italy 3.256⇤⇤ 0.715⇤⇤ 0.508 4.041⇤⇤ 0.782⇤⇤ 2.954⇤⇤ 0.660
Japan 6.467⇤⇤ -0.108 0.226 6.484⇤⇤ -0.101 -0.215 0.226
United Kingdom 9.728⇤⇤ 0.201 0.381 9.649⇤⇤ 0.235 -0.952 0.389
United States 1.344 0.093 0.034 1.331 0.468⇤⇤ 5.138⇤⇤ 0.343
Australia 2.037⇤⇤ 0.410⇤⇤ 0.309 2.184⇤⇤ 0.402⇤⇤ 1.569⇤⇤ 0.380
China 4.129⇤⇤ 0.019 0.473 3.908⇤⇤ 0.032 1.212 0.489
India 7.532⇤⇤ 0.424⇤⇤ 0.665 6.294 0.419⇤⇤ -1.128 0.672
South Korea 10.612⇤⇤ -0.287⇤⇤ 0.869 10.084⇤⇤ -0.271⇤⇤ -1.813⇤ 0.881
Thailand 3.939⇤⇤ -0.118⇤⇤ 0.507 4.072⇤⇤ -0.110⇤⇤ 0.481 0.521
Notes: Panels A and B report OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcients and R2 statistics
from regression (36). Each row reports estimates for country n. “⇤⇤” and “⇤” indicate
statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions estimated in
annual data between 1971 and 2011.
The estimates of regression (36) reported in Table 6 provide quantitative but informal evidence
on the drivers of NXA dynamics. That is to say, the estimates do not provide a formal econometric
test of the link between NXA positions and agents exceptions described by equation (23), i.e.
NXAn,t =
1
2PV( mn,t   xn,t) + TDn,tPV( ⌧n,t   g) + TDn,tPV(t   ).
Even if the sample dynamics of  xn,t,  mn,t,  ⌧n,t and t are accurately represented by the esti-
mated VARs, the forecasts from the VARs only represent the best forecasts using linear combinations
of current variables in  t. It is possible that forecasts based on both linear and nonlinear combi-
nation of the variables in  t have a lower mean squared forecast error. Under these circumstances
the estimated present value terms used in (36) would be inaccurate thereby aﬀecting the estimated
↵i coeﬃcients and the R2 statistics. In sum, therefore, any formal econometric evaluation of the
link between NXA positions and agents exceptions requires testing a joint hypothesis concerning the
restrictions in (23) and the identification of agents’ conditional expectations.
6 Global Imbalances in the Great Recession
The results in Table 6 provide information on the sources of NXA dynamics over the past four
decades. In this section I focus on the factors that have driven recent changes in external positions.
In particular, I examine how conditions before, during and after the 2008 financial crisis aﬀected
countries’ NXA positions via their impact on expectations future trade flows and the SDF.
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Figure 10: Net Foreign Assets and Net Exports
A: Net Foreign Assets (% of Trade)
B: Trade Deficits (% of Trade )
-42-
Figure 10 plots the evolution of the NFA positions and trade deficits (i.e., NFAn,t/(Xn,t+Mn,t)
and TDn,t) between 2004 and 2011 relative to their 2004 values. Recall from Figure 7 that the
estimated present value for the future log SDF, dPV(t   ), was close to zero in 2004. This year is
thus a natural starting point for assessing how changing financial conditions surrounding the 2008
crisis and the ensuing Great Recession aﬀected external positions. I plot positions relative to their
2004 values (rather than their absolute values) to emphasize the cross-county diﬀerences in how the
NFA and net export positions evolve.
Figure 10 reveals two interesting features. First, despite its severity, the Great Recession did not
have a uniform and significant aﬀect on either the NFA positions or trade deficits. Some countries,
most notably Australia, India and the United Kingdom, experienced a marked improvement and
then deterioration in their NFA positions between 2007 and 2009. By contrast, Japan experienced
a substantial improvement in its NFA position (continuing a twenty-year trend), while changes in
the NFA positions of many others were unexceptional. The second feature appears in the plots of
the trade deficits shown in Panel B. Here we see that the crisis didn’t disrupt the divergent paths
for trade balances that existed between 2004 and 2007 for most countries. For example, the trade
balances of Canada and Australia continued to deteriorate, while those of the United States and
South Korea improved. However, the crisis does appear to have curtailed the rapid increase in
China’s trade surplus. These features contrast with the sizable eﬀects of the crisis on trade and
positions growth. As Figure 3 showed, trade growth fell from roughly 8 to 4 percent after 2007,
while position growth fell even more from 16 to 6 percent.
Next, I examine how changing expectations concerning future trade flows and the SDF aﬀected
the NXA positions between 2004 and 2011. For this purpose, I combine the present value terms
containing expectations of trade flows on the right-hand-side of (23) to give
NXAn,t = NXA
tr
n,t +NXA
val
n,t (37)
where NXAtrn,t and NXAvaln,t are the trade and valuation components of the NXA position identified
by
NXAtrn,t =
1
2PV( mn,t   xn,t) + TDn,tPV( ⌧n,t   g) and
NXAvaln,t = TDn,tPV(t   ).
Figure 11 plots estimates of these components for each of the countries in the dataset between 2004
and 2011. The trade component for each county use forecasts for  mn,t,  xn,t and  ⌧n,t computed
from country-specific VARs while the valuation component uses forecasts for the future log SDF
computed from a single VAR. As in Figure 10, I plot the estimated trade components relative to
their 2004 values.
The upper panel of Figure 11 reveals sizable cross-country diﬀerences in the evolution of the
trade components, NXAtrn,t. In principle variations in NXAtrn,t can reflect revisions in expectations
concerning the relative growth rates for imports and exports and/or revisions in expectations con-
cerning trade growth. Among the G7 countries, revisions in expectations concerning future trade
growth produce the largest changes in the U.S. trade component. Between 2004 and 2007 expecta-
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Figure 11: Trade and Valuation Components 2004-2011
A: Trade Components\NXAtrn,t
B: Valuation Components\NXAvaln,t
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tions of higher than average future trade growth (i.e. E[ ⌧t+i| t] > g for i > 0) lowered the present
value of future U.S. trade deficits, whereas expectations of lower than average future trade growth
after 2007 pushed the present value back above its 2004 level. These are sizable variations. In the
absence of other factors, the rise in the trade component between 2007 and 2009 would have brought
the United States close to external balance. There are also sizable variations in the Japanese and
Canadian trade components. Because Japan ran persistent trade surpluses during the period, expec-
tations of higher than average trade growth produce a rise and then fall in the present value of future
trade deficits that almost mirror the movements in the United States between 2004 and 2009. In the
Canadian case the trade component falls steadily from 2006 until 2010 because expected future trade
growth is below normal as the current trade balance moved further into deficit. Variations in the
trade components are even more variable outside the G7. Changing expectations concerning trade
growth produce particularly large swings in Australia, China, India and Thailand. For example,
expectations of higher trade growth coupled with large trade surpluses in China produced a fall in
the trade component between 2004 and 2008, that was followed by a temporary bump reflecting a
lowering of expectations for trade growth in the aftermath of the crisis.
The lower panel if Figure 11 plots the valuation components, NXAvaln,t . Recall from Figure 7 that
the estimates of PV(t ) turned positive between 2004 and 2005, rose to a peak of 0.5 in 2007 and
then fell to -1.2 by 2009. These swings appear largely driven by changes in expectations concerning
the future risk because the present value of future returns on U.S. T-bills remain comparatively
stable. The changes in PV(t   ) had the largest impact on the United States NXA position
among the G7. As perceptions of future risk declined below normal between 2005 and 2006 future
U.S. trade deficits were discounted less heavily so the expected present value of the deficits rose
reflecting a smaller weight on the current deficit. This patten was reversed between 2007 and 2009.
As perceptions of future risk rose, future U.S. deficits were discounted more heavily and the present
value fell. Among the other G7 countries, the German and Japanese value components show the
greatest movement. Since these countries ran persistent trade surpluses during the period, changing
perceptions of risk produced variations in the value components that mirror the United States.
Outside the G7, the valuation patterns follow either the United States in the case of trade deficit
countries (India and Australia), or Germany and Japan in the case of the surplus countries (China,
South Korea and Thailand).
Figure 11 also provides a useful perspective on the relative importance of changing expectations
concerning trade and the SDF as drivers of NXA positions. Comparing the plots for NXAtrn,t
and NXAvaln,t on a country-by-country basis, it is clear that revisions in trade expectations play
the dominant role. For example, the rise in the U.S trade component between 2007 and 2009 is
approximately six times the size of the fall in the U.S. valuation component even though this period
witnessed the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression. This is not to say that variations
in the SDF are unimportant. As is clear from the plots in panel B, at times expectations concerning
the future SDF can contribute significantly to the cross-country distribution of NXA positions.
Figure 12 compares the evolution of each country’s NXA position with the path of the estimated
trade component,\NXAtrdn,t , and the sum of the trade and value components,\NXAn,t=\NXAtrdn,t +
\NXAvaln,t , between 2004 and 2011. Several features stand out from these plots. First, variations in
the estimated trade components account for most of variations in\NXAn,t. Changing expectations
concerning the SDF are just not as economically important as those concerning future trade flows.
-45-
Figure 12: NXAn,t and its components
A: United States B: United Kingdom C: France
D: Germany E: Italy F:Japan
G: Canada H: Australia I: China
J: India K: South Korea L: Thailand
Notes: Each panel plots NXAn,t (black with bullets),\NXAtrdn,t (blue with triangles) and\NXAtrdn,t +\NXAvaln,t
(red with diamonds).
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Second, variations in actual NXA positions between 2007 and 2009 are generally unexceptional
compared to the changes during other periods. In contrast, the onset of the Great Recession does
coincide with significant movements in the estimated trade components for several countries (e.g.
in the United States, Japan, Australia, China, India and Thailand). More generally, there are
clearly significant discrepancies between the actual NXA positions and the estimated components
for many countries. For example, the gaps between NXAn,t and\NXAn,t in the United States,
Japan, Australia, China and India represent more than 100 percent of their respective annual trade
flows in 2011.
What should we make of these discrepancies? It is important to recognize that each\NXAn,t
series is constructed from trade and SDF forecasts that are consistent with time series evidence. In
particular, the estimates of\NXAn,t are based on the assumption that imports and exports grow at
the state state rate of g = 0.065. This is the average growth rate for the countries in the dataset,
but may be a poor approximation to the long run growth rates expected for some countries that
have experienced more rapid growth in the past (e.g., China, India, South Korea and Thailand).
If this is the case, then the estimated trade component will systematically under- or over-estimate
the present value of future trade deficits based on agents’ expectations. Diﬀerences between g and
agents’ long-horizon expectations for trade growth probably account for some of the persistent gaps
between NXAn,t and\NXAn,t in countries such as Germany and Italy. Accounting for the variable
gaps is more challenging. Undoubtedly, the VAR-based estimates of expected future trade flows do
not give perfectly precise values for how the trade component changed from year to year, so some of
the discrepancy between NXAn,t and\NXAn,t represents estimation (sampling) error. Moreover,
it is possible that at times rational agents’ conditional expectations for future trade flows changed
in a way that was inconsistent with the VAR forecasts (because the latter are constructed from
linear combinations of variables in agents’ conditioning information sets). That said, it is hard to
understand why in some counties NXAn,t and\NXAn,t move significantly in opposite directions.
Discrepancies between NXAn,t and\NXAn,t could also arise from the no-arbitrage condition.
Recall that the estimates of\NXAn,t are based on the assumption that the return on each country’s
foreign asset and liability portfolio satisfies the no-arbitrage condition. This is a conventional as-
sumption with respect to the returns on securities that are freely traded in liquid markets. As such,
applying the assumption to the returns on G7 foreign liabilities is uncontroversial. It also seems
reasonable to apply the assumption to returns on G7 asset portfolios insofar as they are mainly com-
prised of freely traded securities. The assumption may be less tenable for the liabilities of countries
that are not freely traded. If expected future returns on these liabilities systematically diﬀer from
return implied by the world SDF (i.e. the SDF implicitly identified by the no-arbitrage conditions
applying to all freely trading securities), the country’s net foreign asset position will diﬀer from the
discounted present value of future trade deficits (i.e. the right-hand-side of equation (11)) generating
a gap between NXAn,t and\NXAn,t. Notice the mere existence of trading frictions is not suﬃcient
to produce such gaps. The frictions need to be “large enough” to aﬀect agents’ expectations of future
returns.
In the light of this discussion it is clearly inappropriate to interpret the diﬀerences between
NXAn,t and\NXAn,t as evidence that a country’s external position is on an unsustainable path.
As I noted in Section 4, a country’s position should only be viewed as unsustainable when the
value for NXAn,t falls outside the confidence band defined by the range of economically plausible
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expectations agents could hold regarding future trade flows and the SDF. At best, the estimate of
\NXAn,t represents a point within this band so there is simply insuﬃcient information in Figure 12
to make any meaningful judgement concerning sustainability.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed an analytical framework for the quantitative assessment of interna-
tional external positions. The framework relies of two assumptions: the absence of Ponzi schemes
and arbitrage opportunities in financial markets. These assumptions would appear in any modern
macroeconomic model and are necessary to think consistently about the determinants of external
positions across countries and through time. Importantly, the framework accommodates the secular
increase in trade flows and asset positions that have taken place of the past 30 years, making it
applicable to empirical analysis. It also produces a simple taxonomy of the factors determining both
the cross-country distribution of the external positions each year, and those driving the dynamics of
the positions of individual countries through time.
I used the framework to study the external positions of 12 countries (Australia, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The United States and The United
Kingdom) between 1970 and 2011. In particular, I explored its implications for the cross-country
distribution of external positions at a point in time, and its implications for the dynamics of in-
dividual country’s external positions. I also considered how economic conditions surrounding the
2008 financial crisis aﬀected external positions via the trade and valuation channels. This analysis
revealed that intertemporal eﬀects (i.e. revisions in expectations concerning future trade flows and
the SDF) are the dominate drivers of net foreign asset positions across countries and through time.
Moreover, revisions in expected future trade flows appear to accounted for the lion’s share of the
time series variation in the external positions of many countries.
Perhaps the most novel aspect of my analysis concerns the role of financial risk. Systematic
risk aﬀects external positions via the world SDF that is used in the determination of a country’s
NFA position as the present value of future trade deficits. My estimates show that variations in
the expected future path for the SDF produce significant cyclical variations in this present value
even when the prospects for future deficits remain unchanged. These variations appear unrelated to
changing forecasts for future U.S. real interest rates. Instead, they reflect revisions in the expected
future volatility of the world SDF, a measure of systematic risk. I estimate that perceived risk
increased significantly around the 2008 crisis, and that this aﬀected the external positions of countries
with large trade imbalances via the valuation channel. Nevertheless, external adjustment around
the 2008 crisis and its aftermath appears to have mainly taken place via the trade channel.
Finally, one aspect of this work deserves special emphasis. The empirical analysis I present here
combines the analytical framework with forecasts for future trade flows and the world SDF derived
from VARs. These forecasts have the virtue of being consistent with the time series behavior of
variables in the sample period, but they represent only one of many possible ways to estimate agents’
conditional expectations. The real power of the proposed framework is that it can be combined with
forecasts that cover the range of economically plausible expectations agents could hold to provide a
robust assessment of any country’s external position.
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